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PREFACE
While reading Studs Terkel's Hard Times, for a seminar in 197**» I 
first encountered information about a farm rebellion in northwestern 
Iowa during the Great Depression. As a native of that part of Iowa, my 
curiosity about this topic provoked further inquiry. In general, the 
farmer uprising of the 1930s was eventful for northwest Iowa and the 
surrounding upper midwestern states. Specifically, the rebellion 
achieved considerable attention for events in Plymouth County, Iowa. 
Having grown up only twenty miles from LeMars, the county seat of Plym­
outh County, I became intrigued with the rebellion, its causes, and the 
people involved in this episode of farmer activism. As the result of an 
idea sparked by a seminar reading, the topic of the Plymouth County farm 
revolt grew into this thesis project.
In two contexts the Plymouth County farm revolt seems significant. 
On the one hand, the county's uprising provides an interesting study of 
local farmer activism. Studied in the restricted limits of a single 
county, special insights into the events, characters, and ideology of 
rural rebellion can be gained. But, there is also a broader Importance 
in the Plymouth County farm revolt. The local rebellion seems to be 
linked to a long heritage of agricultural unrest in America. Viewed in 
this second context, there is more than Just a local importance to the 
events of 1932-33 in the LeMars area. Within the story of this local 
farmer uprising are interesting lessons relative to America's agrarian 
tradition.
iii
The completion of this project carries with it the customary 
indebtedness. Numerous librarians, teachers, county officials, and 
Just private citizens, extended assistance without which this project 
could not have been completed. But, a special thank you is in order 
for the one other person who believed strongly in the value of this 
project. Dr. William C. Pratt, as my adviser, showed exceptional 
patience and guidance as he led me through the thesis process. He 
was a constant source of research ideas, and never gave up on this 
thesis topic, even when the writer fell prey to such temptations.
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CHAPTER r
THE FARMERS* HOLIDAY MOVEMENT 
IN THE CONTEXT OF AMERICAN AGRARIANISM
A strong agrarian protest movement emerged, in the midvest during the 
early 1930s• In Iowa, scattered Incidents of farm protest surfaced from 
1931 through 1933* Sometimes organized, frequently undisciplined, this ^ 
rural insurgency achieved its greatest notoriety in Plymouth County in 
northwestern Iowa, from August, 1932, until May, 1933.^ Under the banner- 
of the Farmers' Holiday Association, economically depressed farmers agi­
tated for relief* During that ten month period, farmers resorted, to 
actions ranging from purposeful strikes to uncontrolled violence* The 
1930s agrarian uprising in Plymouth County , studied alone,, is an inter­
esting and important page in America's depression era history. However, 
the story of this instance- of farm rebellion: has a broader significance.- 
A. fuller appreciation of the- rural unrest of the 1930s generally, and in 
Plymouth County specifically, can be achieved by placing it In the his­
torical context of both group direct action and the American agrarian..
2tradition.
^John L. Shover, Cornbelt Rebellion, (Urbana: Uhiversity of Illinois
Press, 1965)1 and Lovell K. Dyson, "The Farm Holiday Movement," (Columbia 
Uhiversity r Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 1968).
■ p
^Examinations of direct action and violence on the part- or European 
rural crowds by George Rude and E. JV Hobsbavm suggest even broader im­
plications for studies of rural upheaval. Similarities in the crowd 
phenomena of Iowa farmer protests in the 1930s and rural protest from the
1
2American agricultural history contains a rich tradition of unrest 
and direct action. In colonial times, Bacon*s Rebellion in Virginia, 
and the Regulator Movement in North Carolina, symbolized rural protest 
against unfavorable political and economic conditions. Later, in Shays* 
Rebellion in Massachusetts and the whiskey tax resistance in Pennsylvania, 
farmers gave further demonstrations of rural discontent and direct ac­
tion. ^ From the Civil War until World War I agricultural movements under­
went a transition from independent, isolated agrarian activism to an 
organizational period which witnessed the emergence of the Grange, the 
Farmers* Alliance, the People’s Party, the Farmers* Union, and the Amer- 
lean Society for Equity. It was from this general heritage of farmer 
direct action and organization that the Farmers* Holiday Association 
developed in the early 1930s.
The Farmers’ Holiday Association served as the organizational base 
for an important chain of events in Plymouth County in 1932 and 1933.
eighteenth through early twentieth century In England and France will be 
discussed in Chapter IV, footnote 32, p. 7^, and Chapter VII. George 
Rude* The Crowd in History: A Study of Popular Disturbances in Francs
and England, 1730-18U8  ^ (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 196U),pp.
33-^7; and E. J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of
Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries, (New York: Frederick
Praeger, 1963).
Oscar T. Barck, Jr. and Hugh T. Lefler, Colonial America, (New York: 
Macmillan Company, 1968), pp. 197-200 and U86-8 8.
^Jackson Turner Main, The Ant1-Federalists: Critics of the Constitu­
tion, 1781-1788, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961),
PP* 59-^3; and John C. Miller, The Federalist Era, 1790-1801, (New York: 
Harper and Row, i9 60), pp. 155-63.
^Wayne C. Rohrer and Louis H. Douglas, The Agrarian Transition in 
America, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), pp. UI-U3 .
Thus, a superficial connection is established betveen the depression farm 
rebellion anI earlier agrarian movements. In fact, some tactics-employed 
by the Holiday movement were identical to those used over thirty years 
earlier in the Populist movement in western Iowa. However; the rela­
tionship is not so simple as merely reciting organizational ancestry and 
previous farmer activism. Two contending forces are at work in the his­
tory of American agriculture. First, there are the traditional values 
and ideals of the independent yeoman farmer upholding the old rural folk­
ways. Second, and developing gradually in the American experience, has
been the need for farmers, to innovate and organize to meet the: challenges
7of new conditions and problems. In order to build an understanding of 
the development of rural activism in the 1930s , one must' explore the: 
evolution of these primary forces in American agriculture..
Paul H. Johnstone's analysis of the agrarian tradition in America is
Q
instructive. Johnstone asserts that the literary works of Thomas Jeff­
erson, Hector St. Jean de Crevecoeur, and others, molded an ideal about 
country people and country life in American society. The farmer was 
portrayed as a simple, honest, industrious individual. This ideal took 
the form of an American agrarian creed based on three principles. First 
was the concept of the economically independent American farmer. Second,
^Herman C. Nixon, "The Economic Basis of The Populist Movement in 
Iowa,” Iowa Journal of History and Politics, 21 (July, 1923); 391**
^Paul H. Johnstone, "Old Ideals Versus New Ideas in Farm Life,” 
Farmers In a Changing World: Yearbook of Agriculture. 19^0, (Washington;
United States Government. Printing Office, 19^0); 116.
%bid. Johnstone's findings, written in 19^0, are particularly use­
ful since his perspective on agrarian traditions came immediately after 
the Holiday movement of 1932-1933.
kthe creed held that agriculture vas the central feature in an economic
system around which all other activity revolved. Third, and of greatest
importance, was the view that agricultural life was a natural state of
heing and therefore good. In the scheme of this creed it developed that
rural life was good and city life was had. Thus established in an un-
9
written creed was the classical rural-urban antagonism.
Prior to the Revolution the agrarian creed may have held a measure 
of validity in American life. After that time, however, thoroughgoing 
changes in American economics rendered it impractical. Richard Hofstadter 
suggests that the agrarian creed represents a tribute to the country’s 
rural origins, but by the turn of the nineteenth century it was no ‘longer 
applicable and became the "agrarian myth". It was a myth in the sense 
that it, "so effectively embodies men’s values that it profoundly influ­
ences their way of perceiving reality and hence their behavior.
*
Hofstadter convincingly demonstrates the lasting impact of the "agrarian 
myth" by depicting its presence in the twentieth century. In fact, with
the passage of time, the myth, though further from reality, became more
\
11entrenched in many rural American minds. Milo Reno, nominal leader of 
the striking farmers in 1932, reflected the mythical agrarian values when 
he declared that the Farm Holiday movement was "a protest of the assump­
tion that the money lords of the nation have a right to increase their
9Ibid,, pp. 116-18.
■^Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, (New York: Random House,
1955), p. 2k.
1:LIbid., pp. 30-31.
5already swollen fortunes by a systematic robbing of those who produce the 
wealth. ”12 Also touching on the rural notions about the central role of 
agriculture in American society, a Plymouth County farm leader pushed the 
Holiday idea by proclaiming "the sleeping giant, agriculture, must be 
roused if it’s going to save itself."1  ^ Perhaps the most genuine reflec­
tion of the "agrarian myth" in the Holiday movement came in the lines of 
a poem in the Iowa Union Farmer, which urged,
Let’s call a farmers* holiday 
A holiday let’s hold 
We’ll eat our wheat and ham and eggs 
And let them eat their gold.1^
With such sentiments as these, century old rural beliefs were an important
part of the 1930s farm protest, as farmers struggled with monumental changes
in the economic system.
Commercialization, industrialization, and urbanization of the American 
economy were the fundamental changes forced upon the agrarian tradition.
As the American farmer moved from the eighteenth through the nineteenth 
and into the twentieth century, he saw his legendary self-sufficiency 
yield to economic interdependence. Improved seeds, mechanical devices, 
and farming techniques required capital, so the farmer began to raise 
crops beyond the subsistence level to sell in the market place to raise 
money for technological improvements. If the sale of produce did not
12Iowa Union Farmer, August 2k, 1932.
1 L^eMars Globe-Post, May 23, 1932.
lli
Iowa Union Farmer, March 9* 1932.
6raise sufficient capital, the fanner indebted himself to the local busi­
nessmen and bankers. This commercialization of agriculture basically 
during the nineteenth century made the farmer increasingly dependent on 
urban middlemen.1  ^ The creed that had contributed to the rural-urban 
antagonism alluded to earlier was given substance by nineteenth century 
developments.^
The nineteenth century farmer did not oppose the growth of indus­
trialism and commercialism. Johnstone suggests that he embraced it be­
cause he gave great credence to an idea of progress which was the assump- 
' tion that natural law compelled man and society to "go on improving in­
definitely".^ Faith in. progress was easily sustained because the 
agrarian ideal; foresaw the triumph of good. Since* according to the- 
agrarian creed* the agricultural life was good* the farmer would eventually 
triumph.1®
This optimism about the future on the part of nineteenth century 
farmers bred a boom psychology. Agricultural land values had consistently 
risen in the American experience and Increases in land values were occa­
sionally dramatic. Based on a faith in rising land values and the idee 
of progress, farmers came to rely on the appreciation of their lands for 
profits rather than on the income from produce sales. A natural, outgrowth
15Hofstadter, Age of Reform, pp. 38-39 •
^Johnstone, "Old Ideals Versus Hew Ideas*" pp. 118-19.
1Tn>ld. . p. 12U.
l8Tbld.. p. 128.
719of the steadily increasing land values was speculation in lands. An 
underlying assumption persisted that unlimited growth and expansion were 
natural and to be expected. By the mid-nineteenth century the speculative 
nature of these beliefs led to an agricultural devotion to land values 
rather than to the land itself. It was such speculation and boom psycho­
logy that led to many of the agriculural evils in the late nineteenth
20and early twentieth century.
The second half of the nineteenth century brought accelerated and 
dramatic changes to American agriculture. Technological advances occurred 
with stunning rapidity. The Civil War devastated the agricultural economy 
of an entire region. Slowly there was an exhaustion of the good land 
supply. American agriculture grew increasingly reliant on foreign markets 
and domestic suppliers. Also distressing to the rural tradition was the 
rural-urban migration which eventually resulted in a majority of the 
nation's population residing in urban areas. In response to these political 
and economic stimuli significant alterations in rural philosophy and 
perceptions emerged.
New perceptions by farmers at the close of the nineteenth century 
fall into several distinct catagories. First, and of primary importance, 
the farmer was in the process of becoming a minority in American society 
and came to view himself as an underdog. In this new role the farmer
19Lowell K. Dyson, "Was Agricultural Distress in the 1930s a Result 
of Land Speculation During World War I? The Case of Iowa," Annals of 
Iowa, 40 (Spring, 1971): 580-82; Nixon, "The Economic Basis of The
Populist Movement in Iowa," pp. 377-79; and William G. Murray, "Pros­
perity and Land Boom, 1901-1920," The Palimpsest, 48 (October, 196?)s 
461-80.
20Hofstadter, Age of Reform, pp. 41-42; and Johnstone, "Old Ideals 
Versus New Ideas," pp. 129-32.
8perceived himself as "being pitted against urban monopolists and intema-
21tional monetary conspirators. The idea of the agrarian underdog in a 
struggle with urban elements was not hard to sustain. ' Farmers saw numer­
ous examples of unfair practices by railroads, grain elevators, and banks.
22Rural money and credit problems abounded in the 1880s and 1890s. These 
same problems surfaced again in the twentieth century. Speaking in the 
tradition of farmer as underdog, Farm Holiday spokesman Bob Moore appealed 
to a group of northwest Iowa farmers in 1932 by saying, "When the interna­
tional harvester people need some money to buy more diamonds or poodle dogs
for their wives they just add a dollar or two to the price of a harvester
23and Uncle Reuben at the crossroads pays the extra price." ^
As the farmers' numerical status in society changed, so also did 
attitudes about the traditional values of rural life. At one time it was 
deemed honorable to be of rural origins because it suggested an understand­
ing of the humble. However, by the end of the nineteenth century, rural 
origins were perceived as a station in life from which one should rise. 
Within this change in perceptions, a sentimental shift occurred in which
approval was no longer attached to lowly, rural origins, but rather
24
to the people who rose from them. Slowly the farmer grew to see him­
self as an unesteemed character.
21 Hofstadter, Age of Reform, pp. 62-81.
pp
Grant McConnell, The Decline of Agrarian Democracy, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1953)» P* 19*
. W. Forster and W. C. Weldon, "The Agricultural Problem," Social 
Forces, March, 1933» P* 370.
24Johnstone, "Old Ideals Versus New Ideas," p. 1^9* For a discussion 
of rural origins of early twentieth century reformers, see Wayne E. Fuller, 
"The Rural Origins of the Progressive Leaders," Agricultural History,
9In the agrarian tradition, the antagonism "between town and country 
has already been noted. The basic animosity was historic, but late 
nineteenth century conditions sharpened the conflict. The intense com­
mercialization of agriculture between 1865 and 1900 brought into focus 
a sharp clash between farmers and middlemen. Farmers came to see the 
middlemen as price fixers and supply manipulators. At least partly
because of this perception, some farmers tried to learn how they might
25serve their own purposes through cooperative endeavors.
Although farmers harbored a fundamental dislike for the middleman, 
they began to adopt his business techniques. By the late nineteenth 
century, with the days of self-sufficiency gone, the farmer began to 
specialize, producing that which was most appropriate for his given 
skills, climate, soil, and markets. As farming was increasingly recog­
nized as a business, efficiency was sought. Development along these
26lines brought record-keeping into the farmers1 domain. The sophisti­
cation of agricultural bookkeeping brought about the ability to calculate 
costs and thus income needs. By the time of the Farm Holiday movement,
some farmers were calculating and demanding the "cost-of-production" for
27
their agricultural produce. Indeed, farming had moved from an era of 
family subsistence to one of small and, in some cases, large business.
1*2 (January, 1968): 1-13. Fuller contends that many Progressive leaders
came from rural origins and took from those origins important attitudes 
that developed into some of the major reforms of the early twentieth cen­
tury. Unfortunately, Fuller notes, the significant role of rural origins 
has been lost in the history of the Progressive Era.
25Ibid., pp. 158-59.
2^Ibld,, pp. lUU—U5 ,
2TIbld,, p. lUU.
10
Another new perception by the rural community in the last three de­
cades of the nineteenth century had a profound effect on the agrarian 
tradition. Farmers began to organize to meet the challenges of an indus­
trial society. The first important organization* the Grange, was' designed
for social and fraternal purposes, but a structure was provided for polit-
- 28 
ical protest that eventually brought some state regulation of businesses.
In the l880s* the Alliance movement spread in the agricultural sector. 
Lawrence Goodvyn contends that the Alliance cooperative idea brought "a 
new way of thinking” to agricultural organizations.^ Driven by economic., 
hardship*, farmers began to shed some of their traditional independence 
and cooperated in marketing and purchasing endeavors . In this cooperative, 
movement, farmers perceived the potential for political action*?0 Polit­
ical activism was realized in the Populist movement of the 1890s. Al­
though the Populists lacked a formal and coherent philosophy, their* ideals, 
brought together the perceptions of American agriculture at the turn of 
the century. Grant McConnell points out that Populist goals "were not 
narrow class demands.” Rather, they were a sincere attempt to ensure the- 
farmers * position in the political system. 3^ Politically frustrated and
o A
Ibid., pp. 133-3**; and Rohrer and Douglas, Agrarian Transition in 
America, p. 56.
29^Lawrence Goodvyn* Democratic Promise? The Populist Movement In 
America, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp, xi-xii.
30Ibld., p. 177.
^Hofstadter, Age of Reform, pp. 60-93.
3^McConnellThe Decline of Agrarian Democracy, p. 5.
11
divided, the Populist movement crumbled in the late 1890s, hut not before 
many farmers came to recognize the political potential of agrarian organ­
izations.
The new sense of agricultural organization had its shortcomings. A 
professional farm leadership developed from this movement. The leadership 
was sometimes nurtured by the farm organizations. Often it grew from 
governmental agencies such as the land grant colleges, the Department of 
Agriculture, and the county agent system. What was significant for the 
farmers was that all too often the experts attempting to lead and help 
with his problems were not farmers themselves, but rather were urban 
agricultural leaders. Even if they had been farm-reared their profession­
alization had caused them to become urban. Whether created by the farmers’ 
own organization, or by governmental agencies, professional farm leader- 
ship was often suspect. ° Perhaps the corollary was that agricultural 
organizations themselves were weakened structurally because of this dis­
trust. Despite the shortcomings in early farm organization leadership, 
an important lesson had been learned by rural people. The problems 
created by the new industrial society in the late nineteenth century 
necessitated an organizational rather than a personal approach to solu­
tions. Farmers understood the new organizational requirements and acted 
upon them. 3**
Ibid., pp. U5-^8; and Johnstone, "Old Ideals Versus New Ideas, pp.
156-57.
^Samuel P. Hays, The Response To Industrialism, 1885-191**» (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 58-63.
12
In the twentieth century, the Farmers* Union, the Society for Equity,
and the Farm Bureau, were the large member groups that carried on the
35organizational efforts of American agriculture. Generally, the first
twenty years of the new century were good agriculturally. But when the
wartime boom turned to postwar readjustment and then to depression at the
end of the 1920s, American agriculture was once again faced with economic
hardship. Farm organizations united to push the McNary-Haugen Bill in
the 1920s as a solution to low prices. But the far reaching economic
problems were beyond simple and quick solution. As agricultural problems
mounted in the early years of the depression, desperate farmers searched
for new direction. It was in this setting that the Farmers* Holiday
Association of the 1930s emerged.
The Farmers* Holiday Association was built on the idea that farmers
were unfairly treated in the economic system. This economic fate could
be changed if the farmer were guaranteed prices that would cover his
cost of production. When the "cost-of-produetion" claim was ignored
after several years of preaching its virtue, a group of Farmers* Union
leaders formed the Farmers* Holiday Association. The new association
proclaimed that if the cost of production ideal was not met, member
farmers would go on strike withholding their produce from market until
such demands were met. Such a strike was officially called in August,
371932. 1 The events of the strike and actions that ensued during the 
35Rohrer and Douglas, Agrarian Transition in America, pp. 57-60.
^George N. Peek, "The McNary-Haugen Plan for Relief," Current 
History, November, 1928, pp. 273-78.
37'John L. Shover, "The Farmers* Holiday Association Strike, August, 
1932," Agricultural History, 39 (October, 1965): 196-98.
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succeeding ten months are subjects for later discussion. For present pur­
poses the general ideals of the Farmers* Holiday Association suggested 
above provide the connection of this 1930s rural rebellion with the 
agrarian traditions of the preceding century.
In a general sense, the Farmers* Holiday maintained many traditional 
rural ideas about the farmer and his position in society. The farmer was 
perceived as the underdog in society, and he suffered economically. He 
had a fundamental part in the American economy, as evidenced by the vision 
that a strike would serve to show the importance of his agricultural pro­
duction. Milo Reno probably overstated, but reflected farmer attitudes, 
when he editorialized that the Holiday movement was actually an "economic
ofl
revolution.' Further expression of this view surfaced at a Holiday 
rally in Plymouth County where farmers boosted a sign, proclaiming that 
"The Farmer is the Life Blood of the Small Town— If He don’t Get Production 
Costs We are all Sunk."^9 Sentiments such as these emanated almost di­
rectly from the "agrarian myth". Specifically, the agricultural problems 
of the twentieth century were caused in part because of rural attitudes 
developed in the nineteenth century. For example, the boom psychology of 
the previous century persisted from 1900-1920. Such thinking fostered 
land speculation that was one major source of farm problems in the 1920s 
and 1930s. 1*0
^Iowa Union Farmer, February 10, 1933.
^Ibid., August 10, 1932, p. U.
1*°Dyson, "Was Agricultural Distress In The 1930s A Result, of Land 
Speculation During World War I? The Case of Iowa," pp. 578-79; and 
Murray, "Prosperity and Land Boom, 1901-1920," pp. U61-80.
lU
The Farmers* Holiday also incorporated other newer" perceptions about
rural life developed by late nineteenth century farmers. The overriding
view that the Holiday movement borrowed from the late agrarian tradition
was the recognition of the need to organize. The new association utilized
the organizational structure of the Farmers* Union which, suggests Grant
UlMcConnell, was a direct descendant from the Populist tradition. In its 
strike program, the Holiday broadened the cooperative ideas of the nine— 
teenth century Alliance crusade. Member farmers united to withhold the 
supply" of produce from market, thus hoping to. drive depressed prices up­
ward!. The- cooperative marketings idea was widely practiced by the 1930sr 
and. the Holiday withholding idea was a logical extension of the coopera­
tive spirit on the supply side of agricultural economlcsv
Although the Farmersr Holiday Association demonstrated erratic: behav­
ior during Its brief; existence, it generally patterned itself after nine­
teenth century rural organizations. The fundamental leadership of the- 
Holiday movement traced its roots to the agrarian crusade of the previous 
century.. Milo Reno, the principal founder and leader of the Holiday 
Association, had been an activist in the Greenback and Populist organizations
[.rt-
of the l880s and 1890s . A Journalist interviewed Reno and found him to be 
an organizational fundamentalist with ideas dating back, to the agrarian 
crusade of 1870-1890.^
^Julius Korgan, "Farmers Picket The. Depression,” (Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, American University, 1961), p. 31; and McConnell, The Decline 
of Agrarian Democracy, p. 38.
U2Shover, Cornbelt Rebellion, p. 25.
^3James Rorty, "How Radical. Are The Farmers?”, The Nation, January 23, 
1935, p. 10U.
15
A final significant rural attitude that developed in the nineteenth 
century and carried over to the Farm Holiday movement was the anti­
middleman sentiment. Of course, the middlemen were seen as key factors 
in the farmers' escalated cost of production in the 1920s and 1930s. Thus 
animosity was engendered. As the Holiday movement progressed, the opposi­
tion to the middleman became more refined. Generally the middleman was 
perceived as the direct economic enemy of the farmer. Specifically, farm­
ers came to vent their anger at those middlemen who showed no apparent 
sympathy for the farmers' plight. Along these lines, holders of farm 
mortgages such as bankers and insurance companies, or their defenders, 
were the recipients of Holiday anti-middleman attacks. The mortgage 
holders of the 1930s had replaced the railroads and grain companies of 
an earlier agricultural age.
Richard Hofstadter suggests that the agrarian ideals of this country 
are important, not because they are true or correct, but because they 
have been believed.^ The rural protesters in Plymouth County in the 
1930s found credence in their inherited rural traditions. What happened 
there fits a broader picture of American rural history.
In its active phase, particularly in Plymouth County, the Farm 
Holiday movement soon broke down. But it represented much of the rich 
tradition in American agrarian history. The farmers' vision of himself 
as an essential part of the American economy was apparent in this rebel­
lion. The tradition of the farmer versus the middleman also found 
support in Plymouth County in the 1930s. Perhaps the most important
UU
Hofstadter, Age of Reform, pp. 23-2 8.
16
tradition inherited by the Holiday was the tendency to organize to solve 
problems. It was from the organizational base that, once set in motion, 
the Farmersf Holiday movement achieved notoriety and made the events in 
Plymouth County in 1932 and 1933 a noteworthy episode in American agrarian 
history. Although in the stream of American history the farm revolt in 
Plymouth played a small role, the uprising did not happen in a vacuum.
To the contrary, it was part of an important evolution in the American 
agrarian tradition. It is in this general vein that the 1930s farm rebel­
lion should be examined.
CHAPTER II
THE 1930S FARM REBELLION IN PLYMOUTH COUNTY
By the spring of 1932, the United States was in the midst of economic 
depression. In agriculture, as elsewhere, the hardships of the. depression 
mounted. Farmers in Plymouth County, Iowa, saw the price of com, their
n
basic crop, sink to thirty-two cents per bushel by the beginning of May. 
This price decline represented a 25 percent decrease since early January.^ 
During 1932, almost 6 percent of farms in Iowa changed ownership due to 
bankruptcy or foreclosure. Responding to this economic crisis, Iowa 
farmers formed an organization on May 3, 1932, popularly known as the 
Farmers' Holiday.*4 This movement received widespread national attention 
in the ensuing thirteen months. Normally conservative farmers employed 
strikes, roadside blockades, picketing, threatened lynchings, and inter­
fered with legal processes. Nowhere was the activity of the Farmers' 
Holiday more intense than in northwestern Iowa, and at the center of the 
farmers' revolt was Plymouth County.^ The conditions, circumstances, and 
events of this important local farm rebellion are the focus of this inves­
tigation.
^LeMars Globe-Post, May 2, 1932.
2
Ibid., January U, 1932.
^Shover, "The Farmers' Holiday Association Strike," p. 196.
**Des Moines Register. May U, 1932, p. 1.
5Shover, Combelt Rebellion, pp. U-5.
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Plymouth County is located on the western border .of Iowa, Just to 
the north of Sioux City* In fact, the boundary of Plymouth was within a 
few miles of the city limits of Sioux City in the 1930s. Sioux City, 
with a population of approximately 79*000 in 1930, served as the* major
trade center and agricultural market for the three state area of north-
6western Iowa* southeastern South Dakota, and northeastern Nebraska.
Map 2 on the following page graphically demonstrates Sioux City*s central 
location. The grain terminals, stockyards, and meat packing industry of 
the city provided the lure for agricultural products of the region. Run—
i
ning through Plymouth County and into Sioux City was United States High­
way 75. In the 1930s, this hard-surfaced road provided the major 
farm-to-market transportation route for agricultural, products from 
numerous northwestern Iowa counties. Thus situated, Plymouth County 
was the.passageway for regional, agricultural trade.- In this geographical, 
setting, the Farmers' Holiday achieved its most marked successes and 
failures..
"For agriculture as a whole," Sidney Baldwin notes, "the Great 
Depression, began not on the fateful day in October, 1929, but in 1920, 
when farm commodity prices suddenly collapsed and the war-time boom 
dissolved."^ Farmers* organizations struggled throughout the. 1920s with 
a bleak economic outlook. The principal agrarian organizations of the 
1920s were, in order of size, the American Farm Bureau Federation, the
^Federal Writers* Project, Iowa: A Guide To The Hawkeye State.- (New*
Yorkt Viking Press, 1938), pp. 229 and 1*22. *
T'Sidney Baldwin, Poverty and Politics: The Rise and Decline, of the
Farm Security Administration, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina;
Press, 1968), p. 32. ‘
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National Grange, and the Farmers’ Educational and Cooperative Union, com­
monly known as the Farmers’ Union, The Farm Bureau focused its attention 
on attempting to make tariffs effective. While the Grange also sought a 
tariff remedy, it urged direct government subsidies to agriculture. The 
Farmers’ Union, the third largest of the farm organizations, traditionally 
pursued a low-keyed political course of action, concentrating instead on 
cooperative endeavors. But>by the mid-1920s,the Union also turned toward 
direct political action seeking federal assistance to alleviate the farm-
Q
ers’ economic woes. Efforts by these organizations to solve agriculture’s 
economic problems, and particularly the re-establishment of the Farmers’ 
Union as an activist farm organization, set the stage for the farm rebel­
lion episode in 1932-33.
In the early 1920s, some elements of the Farmers' Union began to 
advance ideas suggesting that farmers should be guaranteed agricultural 
commodity prices that equalled their cost of producing such goods. Milo 
Reno, president of the Iowa Farmers* Union, urged state and national 
farm leaders to call together all farm organizations supporting the 
"cost-of-production" idea. Reno succeeded in advancing his idea in 1925 
when twenty-four farm groups Joined in the Corn Belt Committee. In 
general, the committee subscribed to the "cost-of-production" idea. How­
ever, when the McNary-Haugen bill, the chief agricultural relief measure 
of the 1920s, was twice vetoed and the Agricultural Marketing Act passed
^William R. Johnson, "National Farm Organizations and the Reshaping 
of Agricultural Policy in 1932," Agricultural History, 37 (January, 1963): 
35-36; and Theodore Saloutos and John D. Hicks, Agricultural Discontent 
in the Middle West, 1900-1939* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1951), p. 238.
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as a substitute,, the concord between, farm groups broke* Factional divi­
sions brought an end to the Com Belt Committee in 1931. The Farmers * 
Union, instigator of the Corn Belt Committee, itself became the arena of 
struggle over the course of action agrarian organizations should take in 
the 1930s.9
Within the Farmers* Union, two groups vied for power in the early' 
1930s. One group supported the long-standing cooperative marketing 
ideals of the Union and generally represented grain-producing areas.
In opposition was an element generally representing livestock areas and' 
led by Milo Reno*- Reno's sympathies were clear. In 1927 he announced: 
that "if'we cannot obtain Justice by legislation, the time will have 
arrived when no other course remains than organized refusal to deliver 
the products: of the farm at less than production costs."-*-® The "cost—  
of-productionlf" plan , as outlined by Reno , was a program in which an. 
average farm operator would, be guaranteed a price for his products equal 
to his cost of producing the goods, plus an allowance- for his labor and 
a reasonable profit
The Farmers* Union generally subscribed to the "cost-of-production" 
idea, but Reno's1 plan of a withholding movement aroused little support 
at first. Then in 1931, a political faction of the-Union, representing 
livestock producing areas and thoroughly dissatisfied with Hoover's,
9Shover, Cornbelt Rebellion, pp. 19-21.
^°Shoverv "Farmers' Holiday Association Strike," p. 19T.
^Philip Stevenson,. "Reno's Cost of Production— An Explanation,"
Common Sense. April 13, 1933, p. 10; and Shover, Cornbelt Rebellion,. p. 22-
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agricultural program, gained authority with John Simpson’s election to 
the presidency. The leader of the National Farmers' Union was now a man 
sympathetic to Reno's views. Because a withholding movement might endan­
ger extensive cooperative "business interests, and because in the event of 
a strike Reno's political faction would risk its leadership of the organi­
zation, the Farmers' Union could not officially endorse the withholding 
scheme. But Reno, operating through the Iowa Farmers' Union even though 
he was no longer its president, found support and advice from friendly
1 p
officials of the national organization as depression conditions worsened.  ^
In early 1932,he moved throughout the upper midwest states seeking sup­
port for the withholding movement idea. Glen Miller, elected Iowa Farm­
ers* Union president in 1932, citing numerous recent bank closings,
13declared that if banks could call holidays so could farmers. Thus the 
popular term "farmers' holiday" was coined for the proposed withholding 
movement.
The organizing campaign reached a high point with the meeting of
2000 farmers in Des Moines, on May 3, to innaugurate the Farmers' Holiday
Association. Reno became national president of the association and plans
l4called for a withholding movement to start on July U. Because of or­
ganizational problems and temporary price gains in early July, the move­
ment did not begin until August.
^Shover, "Farmers* Holiday Association Strike," p. 197*
13ioVa Union Farmer, February 10, 1932. 
lUIbid., May U, 1932.
^^Korgan, "Farmers Picket The Depression," p. 31.
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The interval between the establishment of the Farmers* Holiday Asso­
ciation on May 3» and the official call for a farm strike on August 8, 
found Iowa association leaders busy generating local support. During the 
summery Reno, advocated direct action as he preached the virtues of the 
farm strike across Iowa*^ Other leaders also travelled extensively to 
promote the idea of a farm strike*
Holiday leader visitations to Plymouth County were numerous, and. 
organizational meetings of the Farmers * Holiday were well covered in the 
LeMars Globe-Post* As early as April U, a township meeting of the Farm­
ers * Union agreed, to a buying: and selling stoppage as outlined by Plym­
outh County Farmers* Union.president C. J. Schultz*?*^ By late May, the
Farmers * Union was advertising local meetings for* an explanation, of the
l ftFarm Holiday by Iowa Farmers* Union secretary Bob Moore* On June 13V- 
Jesse SIckler, secretary* of the Farmers* Holiday Association of Iowa, 
spoke at a meeting in Kingsley in the southeastern, portion of the county* 
and a week later Moore addressed a crowd of 800 to 900 in LeMars.?-^  With., 
the LeMars Globe-Post editorially endorsing the Farm Holiday, and regularly 
publishing accounts of holiday meetings, the farmers of Plymouth County
20were well-informed of the general intent of the ideas behind the strike*
^Dyson"The Farm Holiday Movement,1* p. 73*
^^LeMars Globe-Post. April 1932*
% d . . May 26, 1932.
^Ibid.June 9 and 23, 1932*
2QIbid. * July 11, 1932.
2k
The Farmers1 Holiday Association officially began a movement to with­
hold agricultural, products from market on August 8, 1932.2^ The focal 
point of the strike was Sioux City, but early newspaper reports indicated
po
little success. Two days into the strike, talk emerged that farmers
po
i might resort to picketing the highways to further their cause. J The 
picketing idea was probably related to the sudden emergence of a separate 
milk strike in the Sioux City area.
The fam strike of August, 1932, received a boost with the emergence 
of the Sioux City Milk Producers’ Cooperative. Twenty-eight angered 
dairy farmers organized a Producers’ Cooperative Association in May, 1932.2k 
By August the association claimed 900 members- The chairman of the group 
was I- W. Reck of Plymouth County- Two other Plymouth County residents,
Sam Mosher and Cliff McNaughton, were early-leaders of the milk producers.25^  
These dairy farmers asked to be paid $2.17 per hundred pounds for milk",, a: 
significant increase over the. $1.00 they currently were receiving. The 
chief nemesis* of the milk producers was the powerful J.. R. Roberts Dairy 
Company of Sioux City. Similar to the Farmers1 Holiday Association action, 
milk producers resorted to a milk strike on August 11, to press their
p/T
demands.
2^Iowa Union Farmer, August 10, 1932.
22Sloux City Journal. August 9* 1932, p. 2.
23rbia., August 10, 1932, p. 2.
pji
Korgan, ’’Farmers Picket The Depression,” p. 35.
25john L. Shover Papers, Special Collections Department, University 
Of Iowa Libraries, Iowa City, Iowa, pp. 1-3.
2^Sloux City Journal. August 11, 1932.
25
The hard times shared by the milk producers and the Farmers' Holiday, 
and their struggle for change, brought the two groups together* C. J. 
Schultz, Plymouth County Farmers' Holiday Association president, stated, 
"the milk producers' strike is not an organized part of the farm holiday
movement, but it has the support and sympathy of every farmer who would-
■ i
27
like to see himself and his neighbors get the cost of production."
The co-existence of the two organizations has been pointed, out by Lowell 
Dyson*
The dairy farmers wanted an efficient blockade to force the 
distributors to the bargaining table; but even more, the Farm­
ers' Holiday Association needed a dramatic demonstration: of. 
its potential power* No evidence exists to prove that one 
organization pushed the other into overt action; the question:: 
is moot, however, since many of the milk producers had enlisted 
in Milo Reno's group. Sam Mosher, for example, served as an
official in both associations
On August 15, the Sioux City Journal reported the first; Incident of' 
hundreds of striking farmers blocking the highways* to Sioux City*. The 
largest group of strikers gathered at the Plymouth County line with reports 
that "no trucks carrying livestock or milk had been allowed to pass."^
This action was carried on by the milk producers and, the Farmers ' Holiday 
so it was "difficult to determine who was conducting the- strike*” By 
mid-August, in Plymouth County as elsewhere around Sioux City, the holding 
action declared by the Farmers' Holiday was entangled with the milk
^LeMars Globe-Post * August 11, 1932.
28Dyson, "Farm Holiday Movement," p. 80*
29sioux City Journal* August l£, 1932, p. 7. 
3°Korgan, "Farmers Picket The Depression," p. UO.
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producers' strike, indicating that Milo Reno's organization did not com­
pletely dictate the direction and method of the farm revolt. In fact, 
even Reno's leadership was questioned by a reporter who visited the picket 
lines and found that, vhile "sitting around the fire vith picketers Reno's 
name was mentioned only once."31
A further indication of the inability of the Farmers' Holiday Asso­
ciation to control the August strike was the impulsive eruption of overt 
farmer action. Shover writes that "although specific leaders may have 
set the protest in motion, the farm strike was a spontaneous effort pur­
suing immediate and sometimes irrational goals, different from those of 
the l e a d e r s . ”3^ Direct action in Plymouth County involved such incidents 
as two men pouring 300 pounds of milk from a Cherokee Creamery truck.^
At Kingsley, farmers called on grain elevators and attempted to persuade 
*
them to quit buying farm produce, and persuaded some farmers to return home 
with their grain. ^  Also at Kingsley, farmers seized five milk trucks and 
planned to distribute the milk among the p o o r . 35 in order to stop trucks 
bound for Sioux City, cables were stretched across a bridge. Other Plym­
outh County farmers attempted to temporarily eliminate the middleman in
31josephine Herbst, "Feet In The Grass Roots," Scribner's, January, 
1933, pp. U6-U7.
^Shover, "Farmers' Holiday Association Strike," p. 202.
33sioux City Journal, August 13, 1932.
3**LeMars Globe-Post, August 11, 1932, p. 6.
^ Sioux City Journal, August 13, 1932.
36LeMars Globe-Post, August 15, 1932.
the distribution of certain farm products by selling produce door-to-door.^ 
Such door-to-door sales did not have the sanction of the Farmers' Holidays 
Association, and were probably never the intention of the organization. 
However, realizing the importance of this publicity, Milo Reno was quick to 
praise Plymouth County farmers in their boycott of non-cooperating busi­
nesses in LeMars.^® Shover notes that although the impulsive actions were 
unanticipated, "the spontaneous movement element that seized the initiative 
from the Holiday leaders in northwest Iowa publicized the farmers' plight 
and prompted, political, response more effectively theux any ill-organized
peaceful withholding m o v e m e n t . "  39
The Farmers' Holiday withholding action in Plymouth. County moved 
immediately from its relatively peaceful early strike* activities to out­
right direct action. As the strike progressed through its first days, an... 
illusion: of success gripped farmers In the- Sioux City area. On August 
15, reports indicated that numerous LeMars truckers had agreed not to haul, 
agricultural products during the. holiday.^ Three days later, the LeMars 
Chamber of Commerce agreed not to buy produce for the duration of the 
strike.^ Out of Sioux City came reports of serious reductions, in live—
JlOstock receipts due to the strike. ^ The news received national attention 
in the New York Times, and other major newspapers
37sioux City Journal, August 15* 1932.
3flLeMars Globe-Post, August 18, 1932, p. k.
39shover, Cornbelt Rebellion, p. 50.
^°LeMars Globe-Post. August 15, 1932.
^1Ibld., August 18, 1932.
UoSioux City Journal. August IT, 1932.
York Times, August 17, 1932, p. 2; and literary Digest. August
27, 1932, p. 6.
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Success in the farm strike vas temporary and fleeting * The optimis­
tic reports above-belied the actual i situation. On August 20, the milk 
producers arrived at a compromise settlement and declared a truce in
kktheir strike. As a result, dairy farmer support for the Holiday was
seriously diminished. A truer picture of the livestock receipts story
emerged on August 21. Although receipts had been drastically reduced at
Sioux City, those at other midvestem livestock markets had Increased 
1*5*markedly. The Holiday effort at Sioux City was simply too limited in 
scope.. From late August on,, disheartened by the news of failure, some, 
farmers turned to more forceful and violent actions^
In late August, Plymouth County Holiday members sought to broaden, 
the offensive of" the strike movement.- Their efforts brought- close 
scrapes with legal officials, and violence. At Kingsley, local farmer* 
Fired Blankenburg: was Jailed for throwing a wood plank: in front: of a car 
load of deputies,, who were attempting to break up a picket line. One- 
hundred miles south of LeMars, farmers attempted to blockade the Omaha 
market. Picketing of other markets was Intended to eliminate the trans­
fer of Sioux City area produce to other locations. The Omaha blockade-
centered on the Iowa side of the Missouri River at Council Bluffs. Two-
UTtruck loads of Plymouth County farmers Joined the-blockade effort. 
Several plcketers, including four from Plymouth County; were Jailed by
^ Sloux City Journal. August 20, 1932. 
^Xbid., August 21, 1932, p. 2..
LeMars Globe-Post. August 18, 1932.
^Sioux City Journal. August 27, 1932, p.. 3.
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Pottawattamie County Sheriff Pat Lainson. A recognized leader of the
picketers, Raymond Snyder of Plymouth County, threatened Lainson that if
ho
the pickets, were not freed "the farmers would storm the Jail* Ten­
sions eased at Council Bluffs when the prisoners were, released, following 
a meeting of Holiday representatives and a.businessmens * group. Three-
of the Holiday representatives were from Plymouth County, and at least
50
four prisoners were from the LeMars area* Although the confrontation
at Council Bluffs was resolved, the presence and mood of an activist
group from Plymouth County was unmistakable.
On August 30,. violence erupted at- Cherokee, Iowa, although it was
not initiated by the Farmersr Holiday. Located immediately east of
Plymouth County Is Cherokee County* A group of Plymouth County Farm.
Holiday people* led by Morris Cope*, were soliciting Cherokee County
support in. the continuing strike effort* During a country crossroads
meeting*. anti-Holiday forces* allegedly including the Cherokee County
Sheriff, drove past and shot into the Holiday group wounding fourteen 
51men*. The violence at. Cherokee * directly involving Plymouth County"
**^ New York Times, August 2T* 1932* p. 1*
^Sioux City Journal* August 26, 1932*
5°0maha World-Herald, August 25 and 26* 1932, p.- 1.
^lprank D* Dileva, "Farm Revolts In Iowa,” (Drake University: 
Unpublished M. A. Thesis, 1952), p. 8U* Petitions signed by over 3000 
residents of Plymouth and Cherokee Counties requested a state investiga­
tion of the Cherokee shooting incident *. Three men* including the Cherokee- 
County Sheriff, a former Cherokee policeman, and the president of a, 
Cherokee bank* were indicted for the shooting. The first trial was not 
held until. September, 1933, and no one was ever convicted in the shooting* 
Perhaps the significance of this singular incident of violence was that 
it demonstrated the pitched emotions surrounding the farm strike. Sioux 
City Journal*. September 5, 1932; Pea Moines Register* September 12, 1933V 
p.. 1; and Korgan, "Farmers Picket The Depression," pp*. 89-92*
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organizers, brought a dramatic turn of events in the 1932 farm strike.
Humors circulated that area farmers planned to seal off Cherokee in
retaliation for the shooting incident. Fearful that such reprisals
might get out of hand, state Holiday president John Chalmers announced
52
that "we will not jeopardize the lives of unarmed farmers." Chalmers, 
along with national Holiday president Reno, called a halt to the Farm 
Holiday strike in Iowa on September 1.^
By early September, the inability of the Farmers * Holiday Associa­
tion to control the strike was plain. Although the strike had officially 
ceased, a major road blockade incident occurred at James, Iowa, on the 
Woodbury-Plymouth County line. An estimated 1000 farmers gathered to 
turn back a convoy of trucks being escorted to Sioux City by Plymouth 
County Sheriff Ralph Rippey and a force of deputies. The farmers suc­
ceeded in turning back the convoy. In so doing, farmers verbally abused 
Rippey and forcefully removed the badges of many deputies. No livestock 
from Plymouth County arrived at the Sioux City stockyards that day. 5**
The depressed agricultural economic outlook and the increasing 
violence and militance of the Holiday movement prompted a hastily called 
governors* conference at Sioux City. Four midwestern governors attended 
the conference which met from September 9 to 11. Milo Reno spoke for
52LeMars Globe-Post, September 5* 1932.
53Sioux City Journal, September 1, 1932.
 ^rbid., September 8, 1932.
the Farmers* Holiday* Association and recommended a debt moratorium.
31
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The governors submitted agricultural relief resolutions to President 
Hoover. ^  Meanwhile, the farmers showed little faith in the entire pro­
ceedings, as pickets ignored the strike cessation orders and remained on
57Highway* 75 at James. \-
Then, as suddenly as the farm strike had materialized, it faded.
58
By September 20, all roads into Sioux City were clear of pickets. Talk
about resuming picketing in Plymouth County surfaced, but did not mate- 
59rialize. Farmer activism temporarily disappeared* Perhaps the com
I
harvesting season lured farmers back to their farms. Whatever the rea­
sons, the farm revolt quieted in Plymouth County until the winter and, 
spring months when it re-emerged in. a different form.
From January* until April, 1933, with the farm strike- in the back­
ground, farmers in Plymouth County turned their attention to the more 
immediate problem of farm foreclosures. Although the farm strike was
spectacular, the resistance to foreclosures and farm sales was more 
60significant. Shover notes that,- Iffarmer- direct action was most vigor-
61ous in the attempt to halt forced sales." The farm strike demanded an
55ibid., September 11, 1932.. The governors in attendance at the 
conference included-Dan Turner of Iowa, Warren Green of South Dakota,
Floyd Olson of Minnesota, and George Shafer of North Dakota. Representa­
tives of governors from five other states also attended.
5^Ibld., September 12, 1932.
57rbid.. September 13, 1932.
50Ibid., September 21, 1932.
59i,eMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, September 23, 1932.
60john.A. Crampton, The National Farmers* Union,- (Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press, 1965), p. 18.
^Shover, Cornbelt Rebellion, p. 17.
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improvement in agricultural prices. The anti-foreclosure movement repre­
sented the farmers' desperate, last ditch effort to keep his farm and his 
livelihood.
The movement to prohibit eviction of farmers from their farms had 
been prophesied at the beginning of the Holiday. A midvest Journalist 
had declared in August of 1932, that "if the holiday ends with no real 
results, the irritation of farm people against lov prices will not cease. 
There will be another outbreak. It may logically take the form of neigh­
borhood defense against foreclosures. Plymouth County practice pro-
63vided that foreclosures take place at the courthouse in LeMars. It 
was there that farmers organized to block foreclosure sales in early 
January, 1933.
Stories circulated that representatives of eastern banks vould be in 
the county on January 1, to bid on farm land delinquent in tax payments.
A crowd of farmers, estimated at UOO to 500, gathered at the courthouse 
in LeMars. Either the bidders failed to appear or the farmers' presence 
silenced them, because no bids were issued and the sale was postponed.
The farmers present organized and signed & petition to the state legisla-
6k
ture calling for a moratorium on all debts.
Two types of forced farm sales provoked direct farmer action in 
Plymouth County. A delinquent tax sale occurred when a farmer could not 
pay the taxes on his land. An auction customarily ensued in which the
^Donald R. Murphy, "The Farmers Go On Strike: The Blockade of
Sioux City," The New Republic, August 31* 1932, p. 6?.
^Charlotte Hubbard Prescott, "An Iova Foreclosure," The Nation, 
February 22, 1933, p. 198.
^ LeMars Globe-Post. January 2, 1933.
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high bidder on the land received the land and the outstanding tax. obliga­
tion. Sales of this sort vere typically speculative actions, resulting 
in bids below the real value of the property. It was this type of tax 
sale that failed to attract bidders on January 1, in LeMars.^
The deficiency judgment represented the- other type of forced farm 
sale. Deficiency judgments arose when a farmer could no longer meet his 
mortgage payment. In such cases a forced sale resulted- If no one bid 
on the foreclosed property at the sale, the holder of the mortgage often- 
bid on the property at less than the mortgage value. Since the amount 
bid fell below the mortgage value, a deficiency existed which would be 
recovered by selling the farmer! ss implements and household goods if 
necessary- Such- Judgments were roundly despised because they took, from- 
the farmer not only his land, but also the tools of his livelihood.
LeMars attorney Herbert S. Martin sought a deficiency judgment on 
the farm of John A. Johnson on January U, 1933. Plymouth County*' farmers 
responded violently. Approximately 1000 farmers gathered at the court­
house. When the sale beganr no bids were issued. Martin represented 
the mortgage holder, the New York Life Insurance Company. As the repre­
sentative,- Martin entered a sealed bid for $30,000. which amounted to 
$3,000 less than the mortgage value and would have resulted in a deficiency 
judgment against Johnson. The crowd of farmers pleaded with Martin to 
raise his bid. Pleas turned to threats as one farmer dangled a rope.
Shouts of "lynch the bloodsucker I" and "hang him on a tree," were reported
Ibid.# January 5, 1933.
66Ibid.
3k
by the LeMars Globe-Post. Martin had no authority to change the bid and 
so advised the farmers. The angered farmers roughly handled the attorney 
and insisted he contact the New York insurance company to get the bid 
changed. Martin obliged the farmers and advised the insurance company,
"my neck is at stake." The insurance company complied and changed the 
bid. Feeling strength from their actions, the farmers carried their demon­
stration to a local implement shop to retrieve another farmer's repossessed
tractor. The implement shop locked its doors, but later reopened under
6T
threat of a boycott.
Back at the courthouse, District Judge C. W. Pitts' office had been 
invaded by about a dozen angered farmers who insisted that he declare a 
moratorium on farm foreclosures. Pitts informed the farmers he had no 
authority for such action, but that he would write the governor recommend­
ing such an emergency measure. While Pitts followed through on his promise, 
local farmers also received a major increment of support when Plymouth
County attorneys agreed not to seek "any decree of foreclosure of land
68mortgages until February 13, 1933."
The specter of violence had raised its head in Plymouth County once
again and local farmers had tasted its results. At a mass meeting of
farmers in LeMars on January 7, one spokesman rendered the prophetic
announcement that they stood ready to stop forced sales, but "sometimes
69the boys get out of hand." Milo Reno recognized the contribution of 
direct action, and praised the farmers* militance in a letter to C. J.
67Ibid.
68Ibid.
^sioux City Journal» January 8, 1933, p. 2
TOSchultz.. Although foreclosure stoppages were widespread, the Iowa
Union Farmer noted that "outstanding among the successes of the Holiday
71was the massing of farmers at LeMars." The mass gathering of farmers 
in LeMars on January T» had special significance. Mother Ella Reeve 
Bloor, an organizer for the Communist Party, delivered, an address to the: 
assembled farmers. She asked the estimated 1000 farmers gathered to raise 
their hands if they favored a march on the state capitol. Reports indi­
cated overwhelming support by the farmers. Further significance in the 
January 7 rally can be found in the confusion that began to emerge in the 
local Holiday organization.- Although farmers attending the- rally indi­
cated a willingness to march, on. Des Moines, local leadership took a dif­
ferent position. President C. J. Schultz: suggested the farmers were
"free to do as they like," but felt the movement would "be better served
72
if we stay right here and watch Plymouth County."
On February 8, 1933 , the Iowa Legislature seemingly made direct
action against foreclosures unnecessary by passing a Mortgage Moratorium
Act. The act gave discretionary powers to district Judges in foreclosure 
73matters. Iowa Governor Clyde L. Herring went one step further by
70Milo Reno to Lawrence Gaspar, January 10, 1933, Milo Reno Papers, 
Special Collections Department, University of Iowa Libraries, Iowa City,
Iowa.
71Iowa Unlort Farmer. January 11, 1933 .
72LeMars Globe-Post. January 9. 1933.
T^William g . Murray and Ronald C. Bentley , "Farm Mortgage Foreclosures*" 
The Agricultural Emergency in Iowa, ^Ames, Iowa: Collegiate Press, Incor-
porated, March, 1933), pp. 85-86. The surrounding states of Nebraska and. 
Minnesota also passed mortgage moratorium laws in early 1933. Also, soma 
major insurance companies announced a suspension of foreclosure proceedings' 
on their behalf on a nationwide basis. Shover, Cornbelt Rebellion, pp. 85- 
88*  '
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requesting that insurance and mortgage companies postpone foreclosure 
7Uproceedings. For the remainder of the winter, farmers were appeased
and, although isolated instances of direct action occurred, the number
of incidents subsided. West of LeMars, farmers halted a tuberculin test
75on cattle being conducted by a state veterinarian. Farmers conducted 
a "penny-sale" at the W. J. McKibbon farm on February 10, where only $^5 
was bid by neighboring farmers on machinery valued at $2600.^ In such 
sales, neighbors gathered to protect a farmer whose goods were being sold 
under force to meet debt obligations. The usual procedure saw all un­
friendly bidders silenced, while sympathetic farmers bid a few cents for
each item auctioned. With the sale completed, the goods were returned to
77the farmer being forced to sell. This relatively calm action of winter,
however, erupted into startling violence in the spring.
In late March, Plymouth County farmers once again rose to vigorous
action. On this occasion, farmers occupied the Ed Durband farm at Struble,
north of LeMars. Durband, behind in his rent payments, faced certain
78eviction from his farm. On April 16, tensions built over the Durband
^Saloutos and Hicks, Agricultural Discontent In The Middle West, 
1900-1939, p. UU8.
75^LeMars Globe-Post. January 23, 1933. The anti-tuberculin test 
episode, the first and only in Plymouth County, was probably a remnant 
of an outbreak of farm rebellion in eastern Iowa in 1931, where farmers 
in Cedar County resisted mandatory state tuberculin tests. For a complete 
discussion,see Frank D. Dileva, "Frantic Farmers Fight Law," Annals of Iowa,
32 (July, 195U): 81-109.
^ LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, February lU, 1933.
^^John L. Shover, "The Penny-Auction Rebellion," The American West, 2 
(Fall, 1965): 65-66.
^ LeMars Globe-Post, March 27, 1933.
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case as thirty to forty automobiles were on the farm that morning, respond—
ing to reports that Sheriff Rippey would evict Durband. The LeMars Globe-
Post reported that a feeling existed that the situation would result in
"shooting it out between the opposing forces." Recognizing the tense sit-
70
uation, Rippey backed down in his eviction attempts.  ^ A standoff resulted 
in the Durband case until the farmers1 rebellion reached the pinnacle of
80its violence in late April.
District Court Judge Charles C. Bradley announced on April 26, that
he would hear cases objecting to the constitutionality of the debt mora- 
Ri !torium law.0-1- Five eastern insurance companies brought the suit that was
Qp
to be heard on April 2T. A melee of violence developed on that Thursday
In late April that demonstrated the farmers frustration^ and simultaneously 
led to the demise of the local Farm Holiday movement.
O’Brien County bordered Plymouth on the northeast . On; the morning of 
April 27* a foreclosure sale was scheduled at Primghar, the-county seat.. 
Some 600 to 1000 farmers, many from Plymouth County, assembled to stop the 
sale. The foreclosure was not halted, but violence broke out as farmers 
rushed the few deputies present, took their clubs, and forced some to kiss 
the American flag. According to an account of the O’Brien County- 
incident in the Iowa Union Farmer., a group of farmers worked out an
79Ibid., April 16, 1933.
^°Farm Holiday News. Aprils 1933*
81
LeMars Globe-Post. April 2T, 1933.
82Omaha Vorld-Herald. April 28, 1933, p. 2.
^^O'Brlen County Bell. May 3, 1933.
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arrangement between creditor and debtor and thus the sale was concluded 
outside of court on & compromise basis.®** While the Modern fT6ers, a 
council of O'Brien County farmers who negotiated foreclosure compromises, 
met in the courthouse, other farmers heard speeches outside. It was this 
crowd that provoked a fight that resulted in injuries to some of the farm­
ers. Frustrated by the events at Primghar, and suffering a head wound from 
the fight, Morris Cope of Plymouth County told the crowd "we111 go to LeMars 
and get Judge B r a d l e y .
By Thursday afternoon the crowd of farmers from Primghar, although 
reduced in numbers, entered LeMars. A rally held at the local ball park 
brought forth threats against the owners of the Durband farm north of 
town. When Sheriff Rippey persuaded the group to disperse, many farmers 
moved to the courthouse where Judge Bradley was hearing opening arguments 
in the case challenging the Iowa moratorium law. The farmers surged into 
the courtroom and insisted that Bradley halt the hearing. The already 
irritated farmers were probably insensed when Bradley ordered them to re­
move their hats and proclaimed "this is my courtroom!" and,when the judge 
refused to halt the proceedings, some seized him and roughly escorted him 
from the courthouse. They loaded Bradley into a truck, took him to the 
outskirts of LeMars, and threatened him with mutilation and hanging un­
less he agreed to stop signing mortgage foreclosures. A rope was thrown 
over the cross-member of a utility pole and placed around the judge's 
neck. While some farmers tugged at the opposite end of the rope, others
®**Iowa Union Farmer, May 3, 1933.
i
®^0TBrien County Bell, May 3 and 20, 1933; and LeMars Semi-Weekly 
Sentinel, June 9» 1933.
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removed Bradley's trousers. R. F. Starzl, editor of the LeMars Globe- 
Post , followed the farmers to the country crossroads location and observed 
that ,rone gathered that this business was distasteful, to them, but they 
were impelled* by some grim destiny that they could not resist’. When the 
judge at last swore a sort of compromise oath they all seemed relieved
Q/r
that they could retire with credit.’ Controlled somewhat by the pres­
ence and wise counsel of Starzl, the mob dispersed and left the Judge 
along the roadside.^
The near-lynching of Judge Bradley received national attention. In 
addition to coverage in the New York Times, newspapers as geographically 
distributed as the Wichita Beacon» Savannah NewsHartford Courant, and 
Cleveland Plain Dealer, carried the story.During the preceding ten- 
months, the farmers* movement in northwest Iowa had received considerable 
attention, and perhaps flirted with success. But the wild events of 
April 2T, 1933, caused the Holiday movement in Plymouth* County to lose 
many of its previous gains. Popular support for reckless and illegal 
behavior could not be found. Milo Reno, among others, deplored the inci­
dent.^ The LeMars Globe-Post, previously supportive of the Farmers'
a/?
°LeMars Globe-Post. May 1, 1933; and personal, interview with Leo 
De Force, LeMars, Iowa, August 18, 1977. De Force was an eyewitness to
the attempted lynching of Judge Bradley. He was later called on to testify
in the Iowa National Guard's investigation of the incident.,
^LeMars Globe-Post, July 20, 1933, p. 6. In testimony delivered at 
the trial of two of the Judge's abductors, it was revealed that Starzl. 
warned the farmers of the Judge's heart condition and that, it they did not 
stop they might have a death on their hands-
%^ e v  York Times, April 28, 1933, p. 1; and Literary Digest, May 13,
1933, p. 8.
^Sloux City Journal. April 29, 1933.
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Holiday, condemned this direct action phase of the farmers' movement.9^
The official governmental reaction to the attempted lynching was swift 
and severe. Governor Herring proclaimed martial law in Plymouth and 
O'Brien Counties on April 28, the day after the incident. By that after­
noon, the first National Guard troops occupied LeMars.9 -^ Before the two 
week martial law rule ended, over one-hundred men, mostly farmers from 
Plymouth County, had been arrested.9^ The National Guard’s investigation, 
under the direction of Colonel Glen Haynes, lasted for two weeks with the 
interrogation of hundreds of witnesses and suspects. On May 11, Governor 
Herring lifted the martial law proclamation.9^
Locally, the two weeks from April 27 to May 11, were disastrous for
the Farmers* Holiday Association. Even the faithful LeMars Globe-Post
oli
criticized the lawlessness of the recent episode. By May 11, the 
leaders of the county Holiday organization were either Jailed in a wire 
encampment at LeMars, or in hi ding. 9  ^ A defense fund was begun to finance 
the expected legal costs of Holiday members, and hopeful plans were dis­
cussed to retain Clarence Darrow as the Holiday's attorney. Darrow indi­
cated he was in sympathy with the farmers and said, "I would not say that 
they took the best way in their difficulties, but they are desperate in
9°LeMars Globe-Post. May 1, 1933.
91Ibid.
9^New York Times, May 3, 1933, p. 8.
^ Siotix City Journal, May 11, 1933.
9^LeMars Globe-Post« May 11, 1933.
9 L^eMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, May 12, 1933; and personal interview 
with Leo De Force.
their plight."9  ^ But the famous Chicago, lawyer*a agreement to come to 
Iowa to defend the farmers was rendered unnecessary when criminal conspir­
acy charges were not pressed, and when it was decided to try the farmers
97on assault charges in civilian court. Trials hegan on June 9, and cul­
minated a month later with the conviction of numerous local farm activists
98on various assault charges,
. Through the summer months of 1933* with the Bradley incident in the 
recent background, the Farmers- Holiday movement in Plymouth County faded.
In October, the 1933 farm strike mustered some support in the county as* 
farmers-once again picketed highways. But whereas a year earlier 1000 
pickets could have been assembled in Plymouth. County, the- strike in the 
autumn of 1933 was pressed to gather 200 farmers.99
Enthusiasm: for the Farmers * Holiday waned In Plymouth County by the 
autumn of 1933. Perhaps the wild fling with violence In the spring had, 
soured farmers on the organization. More likely, however, was the fact 
that some measure of economic relief under the new corn-hog program of 
the Roosevelt Administration became available in early Hovember.^® In 
an attempt to control the hog supply, the Agricultural Adjustment Adminis­
tration purchased over 6,000,000 animals at premium prices in the autumn
^LeMars Globe-Post, May U, 1933; and Farm Holiday Hews, June 23, 1933*
9Tsioux City Journal, May k, 1933; and Hew York Times, May 3, 1933*. 
p. 8; and May 10, 1933, p. 12.
96LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, June 9, 1933.
99LeMars Globe-Post, October 23, 1933.
lOODiieva, "Farm Revolts In Iowa,1 p. 129-
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of 1 9 3 3 . Furthermore, with the threat of another Farm Holiday in the 
autumn of 1933, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration announced plans 
to make com loans available to farmers on October 25.^^ The editor of 
the LeMars Globe-Post, a former Holiday supporter, now admonished Plymouth 
County farmers to "grab some of the gravy. "103
Shover discovered two elements in the Farm Holiday movement. First, 
a core of farm organizers with earnest beliefs in the cost-of-production 
idea existed. Second, a spontaneous element of farmers motivated by
desperate economic conditions evolved. The second group brought notoriety
\
to the Holiday crusade. But when some measure of economic relief surfaced 
in late 1933,the direct action element of the Farmers* Holiday withered. 1°** 
In Plymouth County, where Dyson maintains "the farm holiday movement 
attained its greatest strength,"10  ^the events of the farm strike and anti­
foreclosure movement gave way to hopes for agricultural improvement under 
a new administration.^^
101Murray R. Benedict and Oscar C. Stine, The Agricultural Commodity 
Programs, (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1956), p. 190.
1(^ 2Edwin G. Nourse, Joseph S. Davis, and John D. Black, Three Years 
of The Agricultural Adjustment Administration, (Washington, D. C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1937)> PP- 153-51*.
1Q3LeMars Globe-Post, November 16 , 1933.
•^^Shover, Cornbelt Rebellion, pp. 166-67.
^5pySOn> "The Farm Holiday Movement," p. 78.
^^For a survey of farmer attitudes in the autumn of 1933, see the 
results of a poll conducted by the Des Moines Register, and reprinted in 
Bruce Bliven, "Milo Reno and His Farmers," New Republic, November 29 > 1933, 
p. 6U.
CHAPTER lit
CONDITIONS OF REBELLION
l
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In Plymouth County, Iowa, farmers protested the economic depression 
of the 1930s by picketing the market places, blockading highways, and 
stopping foreclosure sales. At the peak of farm activism, a martial law 
declaration covered the county following the near-lynching of a judge.
The agricultural! depression had a nationwide impact, yet probably in no 
other county was the farmers* direct action movement so vigorous, or so 
extreme. What, then, were the conditions in this northwest Iowa county 
In which such a sharp rebellion occurred in the 1930s?
An investigation into why Plymouth County assumed a prominent role 
in the agrarian, rebellion of 1932-33 begins with geography. The county rs 
location just to the north of Sioux City made it strategically important 
in any effort by the Farmers* Holiday Association to withhold produce from 
the market place. Because the Big Sioux and Missouri Rivers enclosed the 
city on two sides, and there were only seven truck routes leading to Sioux 
City, this market center provided an ideal spot* for a blockade demonstra­
tion. Effective action in Plymouth County could shut down three of the- 
access roads to Sioux City.^ Since Plymouth County’s border was just: 
five miles from this important market , strikers quickly recognized that 
blockade action In Plymouth County presented jurisdictional problems for
Dyson, "The Farm Holiday Movement," p.- 82.
U3
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Sioux City and Woodbury County law enforcement officials. Picketing at
the county line necessitated the presence of law officers from both coun-
2
ties to insure the passage of trucks to market.
When the Farmers1 Holiday Association strike was Joined by the Sioux
City Milk Producers* strike in mid-August, 1932, two strike movements
simultaneously focused their attention on the Sioux City market place.
The development of these two separate, but compatible strikes further
3augmented Plymouth County’s position as an ideal location for picketers.
But other counties bordered Sioux City on the west, south, and east, 
and the rebellion in those areas did not equal Plymouth’s response. Lo­
cation would seem then to be only one consideration in provoking extreme 
farmer activism in the Sioux City territory. After all, as pointed out 
by John Shover, the Farmers’ Holiday Association was only a loosely orga­
nized and directed movement, hence strategic planning and execution were 
unlikely.** Lowell Dyson agrees that the Farm Holiday movement, in its 
active phase, was not a highly organized venture. The highway blockades 
around Sioux City, for example, were not highly orchestrated affairs, but 
rather were the sudden actions of area farmers.^  One must dig deeper, then, 
for the factors that brought on intense direct action and militance by 
the farmers of Plymouth County in 1932 and 1933.
2Sioux City Journal., August 16 , 1932, p. 7; and personal interview
with Ralph Rippey, Sioux City, Iowa, September 8, 1977. Rippey was Plym­
outh County Sheriff during the early 1930s.
^Korgan, "Farmers Picket The Depression," p.
**Shover, "The Farmers* Holiday Association Strike," p. 196.
^Dyson, "Farm Holiday Movement," pp. 76-77.
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Bruce Bliven, a native Iowan who covered the farm strike for the New
Republic, pointed out that the extreme activism occurred in some of Iowa*s
6most prosperous farm country. The merits of Bliven*s contention can be- 
seen in a detailed economic examination of Plymouth County. Indeed, the 
county was not a poor area, and farmers in the county appeared on the sur­
face to have been economically more successful, than the average. Plymouth 
County had a population of 2U,000 in 1930, of which 13,800 were farm res­
ident s.7 In terms of area, Plymouth was the fourth largest county In the
o
Hawkeye State. Located on.the western edge of Iowa, and bordering the 
Big Sioux River, the county can be classified as one of gently rolling* 
rich farm land. The exception to this geographical pattern is in the 
western one-third of the county where the land, is hilly and: serious ero-
Q
sion makes agriculture a more difficult task.
The relative prosperity of Plymouth County at the beginning of the. 
1930s can be demonstrated through an examination of farm size and value.
In 1933, the year of peak violence in the area, the average size, farm in 
the county was 190 acres compared to the state average of 160.5 acres.
The relatively larger farms in Plymouth County were no statistical,
^Bliven* "Milo Reno and His Farmers," p. 6b.
^Lauren K. Soth, Agricultural Economic Facts Basebook of Iowa, Special 
Report Number 1, (Ames: Iowa State College, 1936), pp. 16U-65.
Q
H. IT. Whitney, editor, Iowa Official Register, 1929-1930, (Des Moines: 
State of Iowa, 1929), p. 202.
^Soth, Agricultural Economic Facts, map insert.
■^Iowa State Department of Agriculture, Iowa Yearbook of Agriculture, 
1933, (Des Moines: State of Iowa, 1933) , pp. 222-25.
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aberration. In fact, 1*0 percent of the farms in the county exceeded 
190 acres.^ At the time of the farm strike, the foreclosure sale stop­
pages, and the near-lynching, the county was composed of comparatively 
large farms on good farm land.
Farmstead and land values further demonstrate relative prosperity 
in Plymouth County. In 1930, the average value of farm land and buildings 
per acre in the county stood at $ll*2. This figure compared favorably 
to the state average of $12U. The $ll*2 per acre value far outstripped 
the averages established in the surrounding states of Minnesota, South. 
Dakota, and N e b r a s k a . ^  While the value of farm land and buildings in 
Plymouth County dropped to $82 per acre in 1933, it remained above the 
state a v e r a g e . ^  jn both farm size and value, Plymouth County was cer­
tainly not a poor county.
Yet, this county was situated in the area of the state with the high­
est tenancy rate during the 1930s. The nine counties with the highest 
tenancy rates were all in the northwest section. However, Plymouth County 
did not rank among the worst. Its rate of 65.1 percent tenant operated 
farms in 1933 ranked twenty-sixth out of the state's 99 counties. The 
counties of Sioux, O'Brien, Cherokee, and Woodbury, all bordering on
13-U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agriculture Marketing Service, and 
Iowa Department of Agriculture,^Division of Agricultural Statistics, Iowa 
Agricultural Statistics. Plymouth County. 19**0, (Des Moines: State of
Iowa, 191*0), p. i*2.
^Thomas J. Pressly and William H. Scofield eds., Farm Reed. Estate 
Values in the IMited States by Counties, 1850-1959, (Seattle: University
of Washington Press, 19^5), pp. 3^-35.
l^Soth, Agricultural Economic Facts, pp. llU-15.
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lUPlymouth, reported higher tenancy rates for that year. Perhaps farm 
tenants in Plymouth County persisted on their rented farms more success­
fully than tenants elsewhere. By 1935* nearly 50 percent of the tenants 
in the county had been on the same farm for five years.^ The tenants
endured, despite the fact that rent in the county ranked among the high-
16
est in the state during the period. Although the county had a high 
rate of tenancy and rent, its predicament was not as dire as her neighbors. 
One must be careful here, but the greater tenancy persistence rate in 
Plymouth County suggests a significant characteristic in that county's 
rebellion. Perhaps there existed in the county an element of tough farm­
ers who refused to give in to the depression.
Despite the harsh economic years, the farmers in Plymouth County
earned relatively good incomes. For example, gross income per farm in
1930 for the state of Iowa stood at $3,303, while gross income per Plym­
outh County farm was $U,215• Thus, gross earnings per farm in the county 
were 28 percent higher than the state average, as only eleven other coun­
ties reported higher per farm gross earnings.^
Additional proof of comparative economic well-being in Plymouth County 
can be seen in an examination of farm conveniences. If the economic pros­
perity of a county can be measured in terms of material goods, Plymouth 
County measures up very well. By 1930, based on the presence of the
^Ibid., pp. 10U-06.
^USDA, Iowa Agricultural Statistics. Plymouth County, p. Ul.
^Soth, Agricultural Economics Facts, p. 105.
1TIbid., pp. 10-13.
kQ
conveniences of agrarian life, farmers in this county were a generally
prosperous group. In 1930, 7$ of Iowa's 99 counties ranked lower than
Plymouth in regard to telephones, automobiles, radios, water systems, and
electric, lights. Sixty percent of Plymouth County farm homes had radios ;
83 percent had telephones; 20 percent were electrified; 3k percent were
equipped with indoor plumbing; and 96 percent possessed automobiles. In
each category, with the exception of electrical, service, the county* ranked
18well above state averages.
The county's farmers also possessed numerous modem farm implements.
By 1933, although mired in the agricultural depression, there was one 
tractor for every three farms in the county; statewide the ratio was one.
to four. In the same year, Plymouth County farmers owned one truck for
IQevery nine farms. Again, the state ratio was higher at one to eleven. • 
This data is instructive; Plymouth County farmersy despite the depression, 
were economically more prosperous than many of their fellow farmers.
The preceding data substantiates Bruce Bliven's observation that the 
farm rebellion centered in prosperous farming country. What, then, were 
the economic circumstances that moved the relatively prosperous farmers- 
of Plymouth County to revolt? One answer lies in the sudden agricultural 
economic downturn in the early 1930s, and the countyfs particular type o£ 
agriculture.
Dyson argues that the decade of the 1920s represented a period of .
redirection, for agriculture, not depression. He suggests that economically
l8ibia., pp. 155-53.
19uSDA, Yearbook of Agriculture. 1933, pp. 222-25.
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the farmers' situation was not desperate in the 1920s, The agricultural
depression came in the early 1930s when prices for farm commodities took
20a sharp down turn.
Important economic data supports Dyson's argument. An index of farm
prices, with the base period 1910-191^ equalling 100, demonstrates the
point. In 1919-20 prices were extremely high, indexing at 209 and 205
respectively. Prices sunk in 1921 to an index price of 116, mostly because
adjustments following the war had their greatest impact that year. The
price index remained relatively stable from 1922 through 1929» ranging
from 12U to lU7. In 1929 the index of prices stood at 138. Then, in 1930,
the index fell to 117. The following year, it retreated even further to
80. When, in 1932, the index price reached 57, it had achieved its low
21point for the depression period.
In Iowa, c om and hog prices for the period verify the above data 
and add substance to Dyson's argument. In 1927, 1928, and 1929, hogs 
sold in Iowa for $9*^9, $8.77, and $9.50 per hundred-weight respectively. 
During the same years, corn prices fluctuated from seventy-four cents to 
eighty-two cents per bushel. However, by 1932, hogs had lost two-thirds 
of their value and sold for $3.37. In similar fashion,the price paid for 
corn had declined to twenty-five cents.22
on
Dyson, "Farm Holiday Movement," p. 11; and Dyson, "Was Agricultural 
Distress In The 1930s A Result of Land Speculation During World War I?
The Case of Iowa," pp. 577-8U.
2-*-Forster and Weldon, "The Agricultural Problem," p. 362.
22A. G. Black, "The Crisis In The Fall of 1932," The Agricultural 
Emergency In Iowa, (Ames: Agricultural Experiment Station, Iowa State
College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts, 1933), p. 2.
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Surveys conducted by the Iowa Department of Agriculture from 1930 
through 1932 revealed the impact of this rapid and sharp price decline*
In 1929 s Iowa farms showed an average net income of $277^ • The following 
year , the average net income dropped to $763. By 1931 a similar survey 
indicated that average net income was ”$8l8 in the red*."^ As Dyson 
suggests, the severity of the agricultural depression, and thus the anguish 
of the farmer, was most pronounced from 1930 to 1933.
Were Plymouth County to be characterized agriculturally in the 1930s, 
it would have been as a corn and hog producing economy; Corn had long 
been, "king" in the county.. As early as the pre-World War- I years,, the county 
had led the- state of Iowa in com production even though three other coun- 
ties contained more com acreage. In, 1932*, Plymouth County could, claim 
that 20 of its 2k townships had Uo to 50 percent of their total acreage in 
corn. Although other crops were raised, the county was principally a com, 
producer.2-*
Evidence suggests that the long years of corn-dominated agriculture 
had taken-their toll on Plymouth County’s major crop* In 1928, the county 
was the fifth greatest producer of com in Iowa, and for both 1929 and 1930, 
the county ranked fourth in total com production. However , it is note­
worthy that the county's yield per acre in each of those years was below
23USDA, Iowa Yearbook of Agriculture, 1931, p. 7.
2V. s. Freeman, History of Plymouth County Iowa: Her People. Industries. 
and Institutions * Volume I. (Indianapolis: B. F. Bowen and Company, Incorporat—
ed. i9TTTrF.~3T.
25goth, Agricultural Economic Facts, p. lUl.
26the state average, and that of northwest Iowa. Even though the price 
paid for corn ranged in the respectable area of seventy-four to eighty- 
two cents per bushel in those years, low com yields pushed the county's 
farmers toward hard times.2^ The crop season of 1931 brought economic
disaster to the corn-dominated county. By autumn of that year, com
oA
prices had plummeted to thirty-eight cents per bushel. For the com 
farmers of the county, the real distress in that year was the combina­
tion of seriously declining prices and low production. Because of drought, 
total corn production for the county ranked only fifty-third out of Iowa's 
ninety-nine counties. The yield per acre represented the second lowest in 
the state.2^ During 1932 and 1933, com production resumed more normal 
levels for Plymouth County, but its yield per acre remained low and prices 
paid for com reached disparaging levels. The major county newspaper 
reported com prices ranging from a high of forty-four cents per bushel in
early 1932, to a low of twelve cents in the middle of the anti-foreclosure
31movement of 1933*
Plymouth County farmers combined major hog raising efforts with their 
com production. Hogs had long been the primary form of livestock produced
United States Department of Agriculture Marketing Service, Cooperating 
with Iowa Department of Agriculture, Division of Agricultural Statistics,
Iowa Corn, (Des Moines: State of Iowa, 19Uo), pp. 2-5.
2^Black, Agricultural Emergency in Iowa, p. 2.
28Soth, Agricultural Economic Facts, p. 33.
29
USDA, Iowa Com, pp. U-5.
^Ibid. p p .  6-7.
■^LeMara Globe-Post., January 11, 1932, and February 27, 1933.
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in the county.32 By 1932-33, this northwest Iowa county ranked seventh 
in the state in hog production. In fact, most of the leading hog produc­
ing counties in the state surrounded Plymouth.33 For this hog raising 
area,prices were respectable throughout the 1920s. Using 1910-191^ as 
the base period with an index price of 100, market conditions were favor­
able to hog producers by the late twenties. From 1927 to 1929, the 
index price for hogs ranged from llO to lU7.^ However, beginning in 
1930,market conditions soured for pork producers. The index price for 
hogs in January, 1930, stood at 97. With minor fluctuations, the price 
dropped steadily until it attained its low point of 33 in December, 1932, 
and January, 1933.35 From 1931 until early 1933, corn and hog prices 
declined markedly for farmers. It was at the low point in market prices 
for these commodities that agrarian unrest among the corn end hog pro­
ducers of Plymouth County peaked.
In order to fully appreciate what had happened to corn end hog prices 
in the early 1930s, an understanding must be gained as to the relationship 
between com and hogs. The problem was complex as attested by Secretary 
of Agriculture Henry A., Wallace who foresaw no solution in attempting to 
formulate relief in this area in 1933. The economic problems of com 
and hogs cannot be dealt with as independent commodities. Since com is
3^USDA, lova Agricultural Statistics; Plymouth County, p. 3^ .
-^Soth, Agricultural Economic Facts, pp. 38-39.
3UBlack, Agricultural Emergency in Iowa, p. 2.
35soth, Agricultural Economic Facts, p. 22.
^Shover, Combelt Rebellion, pp. 1U2-U3.
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used primarily as feed in producing livestock, it is in the form of live­
stock that corn goes to market.
Agricultural economists in the 1920s and 1930s recognized a classic 
supply-and-demand relationship "between hog production and corn prices.
Since corn was chiefly used as livestock feed, increases in supply, and 
consequently reductions in the price of corn, created pressure for increas­
ed livestock production. Basically, farmers fed cheaply priced corn to 
livestock in an effort to make a profit from corn-fattened livestock sales. 
Reductions in corn supply, and subsequent increases in price, caused an 
opposite reaction by livestock p r o d u c e r s . As a corn and hog producing 
county, Plymouth felt the impact of the above market workings.
In the years during and immediately after World War I , a serious food 
crisis existed in Europe. Enlargement of dairy herds and beef cattle 
raised for slaughter would have taken two to three years to achieve a 
finished food product. Under the pressure of this war-time demand, em­
phasis fell upon hog production which could provide a finished product 
in less than one year.3^ During and immediately following the war,
United States exports of pork grew dramatically. By 1919* 2k percent of 
the pork produced in America was exported. Hog production in the United 
States boomed. By the middle 1920s pork exports resumed a more normal 
level of 6 percent as production also leveled.^ Throughout the post-war
37D. A. Fitzgerald, Livestock Under The AAA, (Washington, D. C.:
The Institute of Economics of The Brookings Institution, 1935), p. 1.
3®Nourse, Davis, and Black, Three Years of The AAA, p. 302.
39James H. Shideler, Farm Crisis, 1919-1923, (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1957), p. l6.
Fitzgerald, Livestock Under The AAA, p. 11.
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decade, corn acreage and production remained steady, causing normal, an­
ticipated market conditions for corn and hogs.**1 By the late 1920s, these 
conditions began to change and the result created despair for com and hog 
farmers.
Beginning in 1928, a series of events set in motion a drastic decline 
in the com and hog markets. In that year, the price of hogs dropped 
seventy-two cents per hundred-weight from the preceding year’s price of 
$9.^9.^ According to one agricultural economist, four factors— consumer 
spending, cost of processing, supply, and discrepancies in hog producers* 
income and expenditures— contributed to this mild price decline. It was 
calculated that because of the depressed market conditions 100 pounds of 
pork in 1928 bought only 71 percent of what it bought in the 1910 to 191  ^
p e r i o d . T h e  weakened pork market provided a harsh economic blow to Iowa 
farmers for whom hog sales represented 38 to U3 percent of total income in 
the 1928 to 1930 period.^ Hopeful hog farmers attempted to produce their 
way out of the mild price decline of 1928. Representative of this ten­
dency was the record number of hogs marketed in Plymouth County in 1929 
and 1930.^ 5
The integral relationship between com and hog production demonstrated 
its impact from 1931 to 1933. The general steady trend in com production
^Benedict and Stine, Agricultural Commodity Programs, p. I87.
UpBlack, Agricultural Emergency In Iowa, p. 2.
^Fitzgerald, Livestock Under The AAA, pp. 16-20.
UUUSDA, Iowa Yearbook of Agriculture, 1930, p. 51.
^USDA, Iowa Agricultural Statistics: Plymouth County, p. 3h0
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during the post-war decade broke in 1931 with increased acreage and total 
production reported. The following year, record corn production resulted 
nationally.^ In the autumn of that year, the Agricultural College at 
Ames, announced with little enthusiasm that, "the State of Iowa is harvest-
j. 7
ing the largest corn crop in her history." 1 In the glutted market place,
corn prices dropped to twenty cents per bushel which was only one-fourth
U8the 1928-29 price. Because of the large supply of cheap com in 1932- 
33, hog production expanded. Increased production of pork occurred even 
though hog prices were extremely l o w . **9
Problems in the export market caused further shrinkage in pork demand 
and thus price. In 1932, Great Britain, the largest importer of United 
States pork,established import quotas on the product. The following year, 
Germany instituted higher tariffs on American pork, which further restricted 
demand.^ Studying this situation, Shover concluded that "corn-hog farmers 
picketed highways at a time when their foreign market was at an unprece­
dented low."51 By December, 1932, the winter of the rebellion, hogs com-
52manded only one-third of the price paid two years earlier. In com and 
hog producing Plymouth County, farmers then resorted to direct action.
^Benedict and Stine, Agricultural Commodity Programs, pp. 187-88. 
h 7
'Black, Agricultural Emergency in Iowa, p. 1.
**8rbid., p. 2.
^Benedict and Stine, Agricultural Commodity Programs, pp. 196-97. 
^Fitzgerald, Livestock Under The AAA, p. 13.
51shover, Corabelt Rebellion, p. 11.
5^Soth, Agricultural Economic Facts, p. 22.
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Compounding the misfortune of declining agricultural prices in the 
early 1930s the more serious problem of the farmers * struggle to hold 
on to their land. The land represented the farmers* livelihood. If taxes 
were not paid, or mortgage payments not met, farmers risked the loss of 
their land. Because of the agricultural depression in the 1930s * farmers 
faced the even worse dilemma of foreclosed land not selling for the mort­
gage price. In such cases, livestock, machinery, and even household 
possessions were sold to amke up the deficiency. A small town Iowa law­
yer commented that witnessing such bankruptcy proceedings, which too often
left farmers with nothing to show for many years of hard work, were, "the
53most discouraging, disheartening experiences of my legal life." ^ In 
Iowa, and especially in Plymouth County, the threat of this dismal process 
reached its zenith from 1931 to 1933*
Farmers themselves had helped create the disastrous foreclosure sit­
uation of the 1930s. From 1910 to 1920, speculation in agricultural lands 
caused farm values to rise sharply. Nationally, average values of farm 
land and buildings increased by 110 percent. In Iowa, values rose by 135 
percent for the same period. Plymouth County experienced an extraordinarily 
sharp increase as average values rose by 15? percent. Values at all levels 
declined gradually during the 1920s. However, 1930 values still consider- 
ably exceeded those of 1910. The consequence of the escalated land 
values, especially during the war years, was a large debt incurred by the 
purchasers. As prices tapered off in the 1920s, and plummeted in the 1930s,
53Beml ey J. Glass, "Gentlemen, The Co m  Belt!" Harper*s, July, 1933»
pp. 205-0 6 .
■^Pressly and Scofield, Farm Real Estate Values, pp. 3^-35•
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many farmers were left owing large debts incurred in good times. The 
mortgage debt picture of 1930 is revealing. Nationally, the debt per farm 
stood at $3561. For Iowa, which had the highest state average debt, indebt­
edness reached $9626 per farm.. At the same time, the mortgage debt per 
farm in Plymouth County rose to a staggering $11,926, ranking among the 
highest in Iowa.55 As land values tumbled during the depression* desperate 
farmers feared the impossibility of liquidating their debt burden. Plymouth 
County land values dropped from a 1930 average of $26,700 per farm to 
$15,000 In 1935* Only four counties in Iowa suffered greater property value 
losses during the same period.^
In addition to mortgage indebtedness, made worse by declining farm 
values* farmers faced the oppressive burden of other fixed costs. Among 
the most burdensome fixed costs were real estate taxes. It has been cal­
culated that, a farmer producing an average crop in 1915 could have paid his 
taxes with income from a little more than three acres of crop. However, by 
1932, taxes had doubled and prices slumped dramatically. In that year, it 
would have taken the same corn farmer income from twenty-eight acres of 
crop to meet his tax obligation.57 Based on the assessed value of property, 
these taxes hit hardest in areas of high property values. At a time when 
cash income was in short supply, Plymouth County farmers faced an average
^Soth, Agricultural Economic Facts, pp. 109 and 117.
^United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, United 
States Census of Agriculture, 1935: Statistics by Counties, (Washington,
D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1936), pp. 236-^5.
5Tpyaon, "Farm Holiday Movement,” pp. 15-16.
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tax burden of $2*»0.^ The typical county farm was valued at 25 percent 
more than the state average in 1930. And in January, 1933, the value of 
farm land in the county was the second highest in the state. Only
5 9
Pottawattomie County exceeded Plymouth in taxable value that year. Not 
coincidentally, these were counties of vigorous activity during the farm 
rebellion.
Shover contends that the farm debt situation took on crisis propor­
tions following the stock market crash of 19291 "The farmers* debt posi­
tion was vulnerable and when investors and bank account creditors were 
forced to make calls upon their assets, investment institutions in turn 
had to press demands upon their farm d e b t o r s . T h e  chief institution 
that supplied short-term credit to the farmer was the country bank.^
The great decline in farm income and land values in the early 1930s under­
mined the financial stability of these banks. Bank operations had been 
suspended and closed during the post-war decade, but the problem became 
alarming in the early thirties. Iowa ranked as a leader in bank closings. 
The previous record for bank failures in the state had been established in
1926. However, the 208 banks that failed in 1931 more than doubled the
621926 figure. Plymouth County experienced an almost total failure of its
^LeMars Globe-Post, August 1, 1932.
^Soth, Agricultural Economic Facts, pp. 118-29.
^°Shover, Cornbelt Rebellion, p. 16 .
^U.S. Congress, House, The Farm Debt Problem, 73rd Congress, 1st 
Session, House Document No. 9, Letter from Secretary of Agriculture, March 
27, 1933, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1933), p. 29.
62Black, Agricultural Emergency In Iowa, p. 3.
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banking system in July, 1932. Virtually every bank in the county closed.
Not only did the banks temporarily suspend operations, but they also forced 
depositors to sign waivers that obligated them to observe a moratorium on 
withdrawals. According to the waiver, depositors agreed that withdrawals 
over the ensuing five years could be made only at the discretion of the 
bank. The ultimate frustration for Plymouth County depositors in this
predicament resulted when the banks declared that they would not reopen
63until all depositors had signed the waivers*
The economically depressed farmer, too often left owing delinquent 
taxes and at the mercy of unstable local banking, also faced the threat of 
foreclosure on his farm mortgage. In 1925 less than twenty-five farms per 
thousand were foreclosed in Iowa. By 1932 the figure had doubled, and in 
1933 Iowa led the nation with seventy-eight foreclosures per thousand farms. 
The 6k00 farms foreclosed in Iowa in 1932 represented three percent of all 
the farms in the state.^ This total number of foreclosures in Iowars 99 
counties equalled an average of slightly more than 63 per county in 1932.
Shover concludes that "direct action was most vigorous in the attempt 
to halt forced sales; these actions occurred when foreclosures were high­
est in number . . . and in the area where they were most frequent."^ But 
Plymouth County, where direct action was most pronounced, suffered only 
seventeen foreclosures in 1932. Shover*s conclusion should not be dis­
carded, but in the case of Plymouth County requires refinement* Of the
^LeMars Glob e-Post. July 11 and lH, 1932.
6USoth, Agricultural Economic Facts, pp. 115-20.
^shover, Combelt Rebellion, p. IT.
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seventeen foreclosures in the county in 1932, eight took place in November 
and December. In the first month of 1933,there were five more farm fore­
closures.^ Four other foreclosure sales in January were also halted by
6tfarmer direct action. 1 The county’s major newspaper had warned in late
December, that unless relief came to the area there would be an "avalanche
68of foreclosures." At the end of 1932, when the number of foreclosures 
per county in the state averaged sixty-three annually, and five monthly, 
Plymouth County neared the average. Had it not been for halted foreclosure 
sales in January, 1933, the county probably would have exceeded the state 
average.
The prospects for a worsened foreclosure picture in the winter and 
spring of 1933 surfaced when the Iowa State Agricultural College reported 
that the state would "harvest the biggest crop of mortgage foreclosures 
it has ever k n o w n . A t  the precise moment when foreclosures in Plymouth 
County reached their peak, so also did the local farmers * direct action 
to protect themselves. The threat of foreclosure as much as the actual 
event provoked Plymouth County farmers to extreme.action.
In the early 1920s, private investors, local banks, and mortgage 
companies were responsible for most of the foreclosures on farm mortgages. 
After 1926, however, a new group of mortgage holders emerged in importance. 
Institutional investors including insurance companies and large banks made
66Plymouth County Land and Deed Record, Book Number 30, (LeMars, Iowa), 
pp. 7-29.
^ LeMars Globe-Post, January 2, 5, 9> and 2 6 , 1933.
^ Ibid., December 26, 1932.
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Black, Agricultural Emergency In Iowa, p. 1.
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up this nev group. In 1925, institutional investors were involved in only 
IT percent of all foreclosures. By 1932,that figure had soared to 73 per­
cent.^®
Corporations held minimal amounts of farm acreage prior to 1929.
However, hy September, 1933, insurance companies, non-local banks, and 
large real estate concerns had acquired about 8 percent of the state*s 
farm land. Corporate investment continued to rise during the depression 
and, by 1937, these institutional investors claimed 11.2 percent of all 
farm land in the Hawkeye State.73- Corporate investment in Plymouth County 
during the period underwent significant changes. While the state record­
ed 8 percent corporate held land in 1933, Plymouth reported only 5 percent 
business-controlled land. However, whereas the amount of corporate-owned 
land statewide grew to 10 percent by 1935, Plymouth corporate-owned land 
grew to 7 percent . 72 Farm militancy in the county came at the same time 
corporate interests were expanding rapidly. Desperate farmers fought not 
only to save their farms, but also against these unwanted outside influ­
ences .73
As Map 3 on the following page indicates, in 1933, the year of anti­
foreclosure uprising, corporate investments were concentrated in the southern
7°William G. Murray and Ronald C. Bentley, "Farm Mortgage Foreclosures," 
The Agricultural Emergency In Iowa, (Ames: Collegiate Press, Incorporated,
March, 1933) , p. 77.
7^-William G. Murray and H. W. Bitting, Corporate-Owned Land in Iowa, 
1937, Bulletin 362. (Ames: Agricultural Experiment Station, Iowa State
College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts, 1937), p. 95.
?2Ibid., pp. 12^-25.
73see Chapter IV.
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and western townships of the county. By 193*+* two townships in the
southwestern corner of the county consisted of twenty percent or more
corporate-controlled farm land. It was' in this section that the poorest
land in the county existed. In good times, the land had been drastically
overvalued. When severe weather and economic conditions developed, the
overpriced poor land quickly lost its value. As the price of this land
75declined, corporations bought it in substantial amounts.
Corporations held 15 to 19 percent of the farm land in the central 
and southern townships of Plymouth and Elkhorn. Perry, Westfield, Johnson, 
Liberty, and Hungerford townships reported corporate owned farm land at 
less than 15 percent, but in excess of both county and state averages for 
193^.*^ With the exception of Westfield, all of the above townships were 
in the southern portion of the county. The evidence suggests a concentra­
tion of corporate investment in a restricted area of the county. As will 
be seen later, this area of the county may have contained the most farmer 
activists. In a period that experienced increased tenancy rates, dis­
gruntled farmers found a scapegoat in the corporate absentee landlords. 
Organized farmers struck out at this threat to their accustomed way of 
life. It should have come as no surprise that the holder of the mortgage 
at Plymouth County’s first foreclosure sale stoppage in January, 1933, was 
the New York Life Insurance Company. ^
^ Plymouth County Atlas and Farm Directory, 193^, (Sioux City: Great
Western Map Company, 193^), pp. 1-25.
^Murray, "Prosperity and Land Boom, 1901-1920," p. U7 8 .
^^Soth, Agricultural Economic Facts, p. 109.
^ LeMars Globe-Post . January 5, 1933.
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The preceding discussion of the agricultural depression of 1930 to 
1933 demonstrated the economic conditions that moved some American farmers 
to protest. In some instances, Plymouth County’s agricultural situation 
was not as unfortunate as others. On the other hand, this relatively 
prosperous northwest Iowa county had developed certain expectations that 
were thwarted hy the hard, years of declining prices and diminished land 
values. In fact, the very land upon which the farmer depended for his 
livelihood lay threatened. Heaped on all the previous discouraging 
economic news for Plymouth County farmers, a chain of agriculturally ca­
lamitous events in 1931 and 1932 struck the county.
In 1931, the state of Iowa experienced slightly above normal rainfall. 
One exception to this general precipitation pattern existed in northwest 
Iowa, in an area including Cherokee, Plymouth* and Woodbury Counties, where 
rainfall shortages were reported ranging from six to eight inches.^® The 
impact on the corn crop was disastrous as Plymouth County’s total produc­
tion was halved, and yield per acre ranked second lowest in the state.
In terms of corn production and yield, the 1931 drought hit Plymouth County 
the h a r d e s t . B y  February, 1932, the LeMars Globe-Post announced that the 
county had been designated a drought area by the Secretary of Agriculture,
and printed procedures by which farmers could apply for government seed
8oand feed loans. Of the several designated drought counties in the state, 
Plymouth led in the number of federally granted seed and feed loans, re­
questing a total of 202 loans* Unfortunately, however, in too many
78
Shover, Combelt Rebellion, p. 6.
^USDA, Iowa Corn, p. U.
Q^LeMars Globe-Post, February 18 and 22, 1932.
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instances already deeply indebted farmers found themselves strapped with 
additional financial burdens.
The local drought persisted through 1932, with a particularly dry
Op
June and early July seriously effecting the corn crop in the county.^ A 
break in Plymouth County’s long drought came on July 6, 1932, but it did 
so under the most unfortunate circumstances for the corn producing county. 
General rains blanketed the county that day. However, in the greatest 
corn producing sector of the county, severe hail totally ruined what re­
mained of the drought beleaguered corn crop.88 Piled on man-made economic 
problems, nature had been cruel to Plymouth County in the months immedi­
ately preceding the outbreak of the farmers’ rebellion.
Only four days after the drought had subsided, and the hail had de­
stroyed the corn crop in southeastern Plymouth County, came equally dis­
couraging news of local bank failure. On July 10, the four LeMars banks
Rhclosed and smaller banks around the county also declared holidays.
The local reaction to the bank holidays did not go unnoticed. Donald 
Murphy, reporting on the Farm Holiday strike a month later, noted that "it 
is not entirely an accident that the area in which the Farmers* Holiday 
is strongest is roughly the same area of recent bank holidays."85
Within a month of this series of economic setbacks, Plymouth County 
farmers, along with others, had declared their own "holiday" and blockaded
8^Ibid., December 29, 1932.
82Shover, Cornbelt Rebellion, p. 6.
88LeMars Globe-Post, July 7, 1932.
8UIbid., July 11, 1932.
85Murphy, "Farmers Go On Strike," p. 6 7.
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the highways of northwest Iowa. The discouraging events immediately pre­
ceding the farm revolt could not, in themselves, have caused the intense 
farmer activism practised in Plymouth County from August, 1932, until 
April, 1933. Other factors, including the strength of the local organi­
zation and the personalities involved, remain to be examined. However, 
coupled with the general decline in agricultural prices, and supported by 
the rising fear of farm foreclosures, the events Just preceding the farm­
ers' strike in Plymouth County provided immediate provocation for this 
important agrarian uprising.
CHAPTER IV
THE ORGANIZATION OF REBELLION
The Fanners* Holiday Association strike of 1932, and subsequent direct 
action in the ensuing year, was not a highly disciplined and organized ef­
fort, In his study of the farm revolt, John Shover argues "that the 
strength of the movement was a tempestuous and little organized force 
whose allegiance to the Holiday Association was tangential,"^ Initially 
the Plymouth County Holiday Association showed signs of a viable formal 
leadership. However, as the farm revolt progressed through the- autumn and 
winter of 1932-33, an unofficial element in the local farmers* movement 
replaced this formal leadership. Examination of the origins and eventual 
collapse of the Plymouth County Farmers* Holiday Association reveals much 
about the restless and independent nature of the farmers* uprising of 1932— 
33.
Historically, the Sioux City territory had been the center of activist, 
farm and labor organizations in Iowa. In 1932-33, Iowa farmers over fifty 
years of age could remember previous rural insurgency. The Populist move­
ment of the 1890s had found its greatest strength in northwestern Iowa.
Just to the south of Sioux City, in 1 89 6, angry farmers prevented an evie—
p
tion by a county sheriff. Labor radicalism also surfaced in the Sioux
^Shover, Cornbelt Rebellion, p. 57.
^Nixon, "The Economic Basis of The Populist Movement In Iowa," pp. 
380-82 and 39^.
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City area in 191*+ and 1915. An army of transient farm workers, organized 
by the Industrial Workers of the World, held large rallies and demonstra­
tions. 3 According to Everett Luoma, Sioux City became a "wobblies paradise" 
under the mayoral administration of Wallace Short.^ One reporter of the 
1930s rural rebellion felt the World War I labor agitation had left its 
mark on the are a .5 It was with this heritage of activist organization that 
Plymouth County farmers forged their Farmers' Holiday Association in 1932.
In the first in-depth' study of the Farmers* Holiday movement, Julius
Korgan contended that the Farmers' Union and the Farmers' Holiday Associa-
£
tion functioned as separate organizations. Despite this technical separa­
tion, however, the Holiday Association relied heavily on the sympathy of 
the Farmers' Union. And, in some areas, the established Union organization 
machinery was utilized as the organizational base of the Holiday.^ It was 
not unusual to find farmers who served as officers in, and supported both
Q
organizations. Glen Miller, president of the Iowa Farmers' Union, an­
nounced early in the movement "that the Farmers* Union is sponsoring this 
'Holiday' movement."^ At the local level, C. J. Schultz served as president
^Federal Writers' Project, Iowa: A Guide To The Hawkeye State, p. 3C&.
^Everett E. Luoma, The Farmer Takes A Holiday, (New York: Exposition
Press, 1967), p. 13.
^Bliven, "Milo Reno and His Farmers," p. 6U.
^Korgan, "Farmers Picket The Depression," p. 18.
^Dyson, "The Farm Holiday Movement," p. 78.
Q
Morgan, "Farmers Picket The Depression," p. 31.
9lowa Union Fanner, March 9> 1932.
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of the Plymouth County Holiday Association, and was on the Farmers* Union 
Board of Directors.1^ In Plymouth County, the mingling of the Farmers* 
Union and the Holiday was evident from mid-1932, but? Union importance 
dwindled and disappeared as the local Holiday Association took form.
On January 8, 1932, C. J. Schultz was elected president of the Plym­
outh County Farmers* Union* At the same meeting, local members resolved 
to commend Schultz, Milo Reno, and other leaders who spoke for the better­
ment of their organization.13- By early February, Schultz was moving 
through the county bolstering the Union’s organization.12 The first local 
mention of a Farmers* Holiday came in a discussion by Schultz at a town­
ship Farmers* Union meeting on April 1, 1932.^  Later, on May 23, the 
LeMars Globe-Post carried an invitation from the local Farmers* Union 
which encouraged farmers to attend a county-wide meeting for an explana­
tion of the Holiday.1** The May invitation was the last local press report 
on the Farmers* Union for the duration of the Holiday movement. By June, 
at least in press coverage, the Farmers* Holiday was in ascendance in Plym­
outh County as mention of the Union disappeared. The two local organiza­
tions apparently operated as one, with only the Holiday group receiving 
public attention. It is noteworthy that C. J. Schultz, the county presi­
dent of the Union, also had the official title of president of the county’s
^Ibid., September 21, 1932.
11LeMars Globe-Post, January 11, 1932.,
12Ibid., February U, 1932.
13Ibid., April k % 1932.
lUIbid., May 23, 1932.
TO
Farmers* Holiday Association. Exactly when the designation as chief of 
the Holiday group occurred is uncertain. What is certain is that by Au­
gust, the press recognized Schultz as the local Holiday head.^ Yet 
another example of the close relationship of the two local organizations 
was demonstrated when the Holiday organizers utilized a.Farmers* Union 
meeting to enhance their petition drive for the projected withholding 
movement.^
Throughout the summer, the Farmers* Holiday Association gained organi­
zational strength. State Holiday leaders made numerous visits to Plymouth 
County organizational meetings.^7 The usual procedure at these meetings 
included a speech on the Holiday idea and the passing of petitions seek­
ing signatures in support of the withholding movement. Official member­
ship in the Farmers* Holiday Association was solicited at & cost of
-j Q
$1.00. Reporter Donald Murphy noted that "the area around Sioux City 
has a good many Farmers* Union members and many more supporters of the 
Farmers* Holiday."^ Membership statistics support Murphy*s observation. 
Plymouth County had six Farmers* Union locals and 272 members in March,
1932. By March, 1933, the number of locals had risen to nine and total 
membership reached 322. The county ranked fourth in the state for 1932 
in terms of new members. In the first three months of 1933, at the
^Ibid. , August 18, 1932.
l6rbld., July 5, 1932.
^See Chapter II, p. 23.
1 flPersonal interview with Henry Erichsen, Plymouth County Farmers* 
Holiday Association member in the 1930s, Remsen, Iowa, August 18, 1977.
1 ^Murphy, ’*The Farmers Go On Strike,'* p. 67.
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height of the anti-foreclosure movement, the county claimed 29 new mem­
bers. ^  Indeed, membership in the Farmers' Union seemingly surged in Plym­
outh County at the same time that the Holiday was active. Since the organi­
zations virtually operated as one, the numbers indicate that the Farmers' 
Holiday succeeded in attracting considerable Plymouth County support.
The strength of the Holiday organizational effort in Plymouth County 
lay in the eastern and southern townships. The LeMars Globe-Post gave 
regular press attention to the Holiday movement. From April through July,
1932, the newspaper reported on twelve Holiday organizational meetings.
Map U depicts the township distribution of those meetings. Grant and America 
townships each held one meeting. The remaining ten organizational meetings 
took place in the eastern and southern townships of the county.21 As re­
ported by the Iowa Union Farmer , seven of the nine local Farmers1 Union
op
organizations existed in the southern and eastern section of the county.
The concentration of the farmers' movement in that portion of the county 
did not go unrecognized by the Globe-Post, which noted that farmers "in that: 
part of the county are quietly forming the nucleus of a county-wide move­
ment. "^3 it was precisely this area of the county that had suffered seri­
ous drought, heavy hail damages in early July, and numerous bank closings 
in mid-July.
^Iowa Union Farmer, March 9 r 1932, January 25» March 22, and April 19*
1933.
^LeMars Globe-Post. April through July, 1932.
22Iowa Union Farmer. March 22, 1933.
2^LeMara Globe-Post» July 21, 1932.
2^Ibid., July T, l1*, 18, and 21, 1932.
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Although the early months of the Holiday movement in Plymouth County
showed encouraging signs of attendance and interest, internal organizational
weakness was apparent from the outset. For example, the exact plans and
methods of the Holiday remained unclear. In early May, 1932* the LeMars
Globe-Post, in response to a letter critical of the newspaper’s coverage of
25the Holiday, claimed uncertainty as to what the movement entailed. Such
ignorance was understandable. At a Holiday meeting on June 22, in LeMars,
Bob Moore, secretary of the Iowa Farmers* Union, announced that "the
farmers * holiday movement is spontaneous. It is so spontaneous that we
have not even prepared sill our plans. . . . You are going to be asked to
26share in the planning." This comment suggests that the leaders did not 
have an overall plan for the Holiday at this point.
One indication of the lack of centralized control of the Holiday move­
ment surfaced at the start of the strike. Shover found that the strike in 
the vicinity of Sioux City
was a different movement from that planned by the leaders of the 
Farmers* Holiday Association. In all the preceding buildup there 
had been no mention of picketing. Yet at the very Inception of 
the withholding movement farmers in Plymouth and Woodbury counties 
patrolled highways and threatened non-cooperating farmers. 27
Korgan suggests that the early violence around Sioux City was caused by the
28separate dairy farmers* movement. The first report of direct action 
against property occurred in Plymouth County when two farmers poured 300
25Ibid., May 12, 1932.
26Ibid., June 23, 1932.
2^Shover, Cornbelt Rebellion, p. 4l.
00
Korgan, "Farmers Picket The Depression," p. 40.
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pounds of cream from a Cherokee Creamery truck onto the ground on August 
29
12. On the night of August 14, the first picketing arose with estimates
30that 1000 to 1500 farmers guarded the roads of Plymouth County. Around
Sioux City, eight or nine picket camps were established on major truck 
31routes. At these camps anywhere from a handful to 300 farmers were gath­
ered. Pickets huddled around camp fires and were usually notified by tele­
phone and messenger; about trucks headed in their direction. When trucks 
approached, the pickets, armed with clubs and bricks, blocked the roads, a
committee man would explain their cause, and they usually held firm against
32allowing passage of produce. In Kingsley, in southeastern Plymouth County,
the Holiday broadened its activity when representatives of the farmers used
the threat of boycott to persuade produce houses and stores not to buy
33dairy goods during the Holiday. ^
By the end of the first week of the strike, a crowd of 150 farmers 
near LeMars had reached an agreement with J. C. Gillespie, president of the
29Sioux City Journal» August 13, 1932.
30LeMars Globe-Post, August 15* 1932.
^ Iowa Union Farmer, August 24, 1932.
^^Herbst, "Feet In The Grass Roots," pp. 47-48j and Mary Heaton 
Vorse, "Rebellion In The Combelt," Harper * s, December, 1932, p. 5« In 
blocking market places by stopping vehicles, the Holiday farmers were employ­
ing tactics that were at least as old as eighteenth century rural protests 
in England. Like their historical counterparts, these crowds sought to 
satisfy "immediate and particular grievances." The 1930s picketers sought 
to drive up depressed prices by restricting the supply of goods in the market 
place. Similar to the activist rural crowds in eighteenth and nineteenth 
century England and France, these farmers were reformers rather than 
revolutionaries. See Rude, The Crowd In History, p. 30? George Rude, The 
Crowd In The French Revolution, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1959)*
pp. 232-33? an<i Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels, pp. 5-6.
•^ LeMars Globe-Post, August 15, 1932.
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Chamber of Commerce, and local businessmen, not to buy produce during the 
Holiday. In a press release, Milo Reno praised the Plymouth County organi­
zation for its work in attempting to include merchants in the movement, and 
urged other locals to employ similar tactics. The local organization had 
taken actions which broadened the Holiday effort, and impressed the national 
leadership.
Yet even in Plymouth County, the degree of organizational control
during the August strike seemed marginal. The LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel
pointed out that officials had problems dealing with the strike because
"it is difficult to find anyone whose authority is respected by other 
35strikers." The pro-Holiday Globe-Post echoed similar sentiments, when 
it reported that the local Wells dairy, seeking to cooperate in the strike, 
"experienced difficulty in getting proposals acted upon, for there seems to 
be no way of being sure just what has authority among the strikers." 
Furthermore, once the milk strike ended, an agreement between the Farmers' 
Holiday Association and LeMars produce houses permitted eggs, butter, 
cream and milk to move into the town. Despite the agreement, many farmers 
independently continued to stop the flow of dairy products into the 
county seat. But the number not abiding by the agreement was small and 
they were chastised by the LeMars Globe-Post for giving "their cause a 
black eye."3^
^ Ibid. , August 15 and 18, 1932.
3^LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, August 19» 1932.
^ LeMars Globe-Post, August 22, 1932.
37Ibid., August 29, 1932.
?6
By the end of August, even local control of the striking farmers vas "be­
ginning to deteriorate.
I. W. Reck, Plymouth County dairy farmer and leader of the milk 
producers, announced the signing of an agreement and an end to the milk 
strike on August 2 6. Farmers, buoyed by the success of the milk producers, 
intensified picketing in Plymouth County in an attempt to prohibit all 
produce from reaching L e M a r s . As a result of the tight blockade of 
LeMars, many non-cooperating farmers shipped their produce to Cherokee in 
the next county, thirty miles east of LeMars. Plymouth County Holiday 
members led by Morris Cope, but without the sanction of county leaders, 
then attempted to organize farmers around Cherokee in order to blockade 
that market place from uncooperative farmers,39 Qn August 30, at an orga­
nizational. rally on the Cherokee-Plymouth County line, violence broke out, 
as an automobile drove past and shots were fired at the Holiday organizers.**® 
A sixteen year old Kingsley farm youth attending the Holiday meeting received 
serious wounds in the incident.
Two days following the Cherokee violence, Reno and John Chalmers, chair­
man of the Iowa Farmers* Holiday Association, issued a call for cessation of 
the Farm Holiday activities until a governors* conference scheduled to meet 
in Sioux City on September 9, had convened. But the same day the order was 
issued, pickets were increased at the Plymouth-Woodbury County line. A
38sioux City Journal, August 27, 1932.
^ Ibid., September 1, 1932, p . 5 .
**®Erichsen, personal interview.
**^ Sloux City Journal, September 1, 1932, p. 5*
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Sioux City Journal reporter wrote that Plymouth County farmers, embitter­
ed by the Cherokee incident, "still had their grievances."*42 In fact, 
the most intense picketing of the farm strike occurred after the cessa­
tion order. On September 5, four truckers were injured as they attempted 
to cross the picket line north of Sioux City, in Plymouth County.^3 Two 
days later, an estimated 1000 pickets massed at the county line town of 
James and stopped a convoy of twenty-five trucks organized by the Plymouth 
County Sheriff and bound for Sioux City from LeMars. Sheriff Rippey and 
fifty deputies escorted the trucks. The strikers successfully turned back 
the convoy after some violence and many threats to the law officers. In 
the confrontation, several trucks were damaged and many of the escorting 
deputies had their badges forcibly removed.*4*4 Despite the national and 
state organizations' call for a halt in the withholding movement, the"
Sioux City Journal reported on September 8, that "no livestock arrived at 
the yards from Plymouth County today."*4 5 As far as these local farmers- 
were concerned, the strike was still in effect.
Not only did the striking farmers in Plymouth County ignore the leader­
ship of the state auid national Farmers* Holiday Association, they ed.se 
apparently acted outside the authority of the locetl formed, leadership. 
Raymond Snyder of Kingsley held no officied. position in the Plymouth County 
Holiday* Association, yet on August 25 he led a large delegation of Kingsley
**2Ibid., pp.:. 1—U.
^^Xbid., September 6, 1932.
^LeMars Globe-Post, September 8, 1932; auad Sioux City Journad., Septem­
ber 8, 1932.
145S i o u x  city Journal, September 8, 1932.
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area picketers to Council Bluffs to help in a milk strike at that location. 
Reports indicated that Snyder assumed the role of spokesman and leader of 
the pickets at Council Bluffs. It was Snyder who threatened to lead a
h/r
raid on the Jail unless pickets held there were released. ° Another unof­
ficial leader and organizer of the local Holiday was Morris Cope, also of 
Kingsley. A former Holiday member recalled Cope as "quite a talker," and 
remembered him as more of a, leader in Plymouth County than C. J. Schultz.**7 
As the strike progressed, Schultz lost control of the local organiza­
tion and an informal leadership developed. A newspaper list of farmers
leading the strike effort at James on September 7, did not include Schultz.
liftAmong the leaders, however, was Morris Cope. 0 A few days later, at the 
Governors' Conference, Iowa Governor Dan Turner called in two strike leaders, 
identified only by age, for a secret meeting. Turner informed the men that 
he would be forced to call out the National Guard if the picketing did not 
cease. Turner himself estimated the men to be about thirty years of age.**9 
The meeting and the. ages are significant because. CT. J. Schultz was fifty- 
seven at the time of the strike and seemingly excluded from an important 
meeting pertaining to the strike effort. Apparently, by the time of the 
Sioux City Governors* Conference, the formal leadership of the Farmers’ 
Holiday Association in Plymouth County diminished, as an informal leader­
ship on the part of more activist farmers emerged.
^Tbid., August 26, 1932; and New York: Times, August 26, 1932, p. 1.
1*7'Erichsen, personal interview-
^ LeMars Globe-Post, September 8, 1932.
"Governor Dan Turner: Personal Account of Farmers’ Holiday,"
October, 1961, Shover Papers.
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Striking farmers of the Sioux City area met immediately following 
the Governors’ Conference and voted overwhelmingly to continue their 
picketing operations. In a mass meeting at which only Farmers* Holiday 
members were admitted, a vote by a two-to-one margin favored the continua­
tion of picketing.^0 Another indication that the direction of the Holiday 
movement was now in the hands of new leaders rather than the original, 
leadership surfaced after" a Sioux City Holiday meeting on September 18.
At the meeting, the executive council of the National Farmers* Holiday 
Association voted to resume grain and livestock withholding efforts. The
national committee suggested, however, identification and persuasion of
Sinon-cooperating farmers rather than picketing. Nevertheless, despite 
this decision, some Plymouth County farmers continued to support picket­
ing. They met at Kingsley the next day and voted to maintain their opera­
tions because they believed, as the LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel reported, 
"to stop would Jeopardize the entire m o v e m e n t . "52 But farmer picketing 
never achieved the intensity it had had in the preceding weeks, and it 
soon faded. The last pickets reported were those in Plymouth County at. 
J a m e s . 53 When the pickets vacated their posts, the Farmers* Holiday
5Qsioux City Journal, September lU, 1932; and Herbst, "Feet In The 
Grass Roots," p. 9^* At this particular meeting the crowd was anything 
but an unruly mob. One-thousand farmers gathered and only actual picketers^ 
were allowed to vote. In order to cast a ballot , each voter had to be 
identified by two fellow picketers. Although operating outside the sanc­
tion of the formal Holiday organization, these were informally organized 
people who earnestly believed in their picketing cause.
5^-Sioux City Journal, September 19» 1932.
52LeMar8 Semi-Weekly Sentinel, September 20,. 1932.
53gjoux City Journal. September 21, 1932, p. 5.
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withholding movement also stopped. The farm strike had achieved some 
temporary success in mid-August because of direct action picketing, and 
aid from the milk strike, rather than because of any plan on the part of 
the Farmers* Holiday Association. Formal leadership of the farm strike 
of 1932 was an illusion given strength by the bold actions of independently 
activist farmers. The leadership that planned the Farmers* Holiday at the 
national, state, and local levels in the summer, witnessed the deteriora­
tion of its control as the peaceful withholding idea gave way to sometimes 
violent picketing and other bold actions.
After the farm strike of August and September, 1932, the agrarian 
revolt moved to the anti-foreclosure phase of its history. The drive by 
farmers to protect themselves from foreclosures had its prophets. Report­
ing on the failure of the strike around Sioux City, Donald Murphy suggested 
that farmer activism would erupt again and that "it may logically take the 
form of neighborhood defense against foreclosure." A precedent for this 
type of activity had been set in the Sioux City area over thirty years 
earlier in the Populist movement.^ The official leadership of the Farmers* 
Holiday Association was sensitive to the foreclosure threat and officially 
requested a moratorium on mortgage debts at the Sioux City Governors* 
Conference. ^  As the strike movement collapsed after the governors* con­
ference, the Holiday Association attempted to regain the initiative by act­
ing on foreclosures. At the special executive council meeting of the
^Murphy, "Farmers Go On Strike," p. 6 7.
^Nixon, "The Economic Basis of the Populist Movement in Iowa," p. 39^- 
Sioux City Journal, September 11, 1932.
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national organization in Sioux City, on September 18, a resolution was 
passed, urging local farmers to organize to prevent foreclosures and evic­
tions during the approaching winter. ^  Once again, however, the Holiday 
Association appeared to be the promoter of an idea but organizationally 
incapable of following it through. Shover concludes that the anti-fore­
closure movement was "largely uncoordinated and little guided by any for­
mal organization or l e a d e r s . V i e w e d  from the national or state orga­
nizational level, Shover*s contention has merit. However, when examined 
in a local context, revisions may be in order. Although the formal Holiday 
organization and leaders may have lost control of the movement, an informal 
leadership filled the void and provided coordination for local protesting 
farmers in the winter and spring of 1933. Plymouth County is a clear case 
of a local Holiday movement whose formal leadership lost control, and then 
was replaced by a new authority during the anti-foreclosure crusade.
Milo Reno contributed at least one very important idea to the anti­
foreclosure campaign. He called for the formation of local "Councils of 
Defense . " These Councils would operate outside the legal system and seek 
agreeable arrangements between creditors and debtors, thus precluding 
foreclosure proceedings.59 The Councils, which were found in many Iowa 
counties, were composed of local farmers, and were the anti-foreclosure 
arm of the Farmers* Holiday Association.^ Although they were organized
^ LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, September 20, 1932.
5®Shover, "The Penny-Auction Rebellion," p. 6 6.
59i)yson, "The Farm Holiday Movement," p. 131.
^°Iowa Union Farmer. December 28, 1932.
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for purposes of peaceable negotiation of farm debts, the Councils clearly 
directed large numbers of Holiday members when direct action was desired.
A Journalist, who observed them in operation in the LeMars area, reported 
that the Councils stemmed directly from the Holiday movement, and, if they 
determined a farm foreclosure unjust, word passed "to a thousand farmers 
and the foreclosure is halted."^ The Council of Defense arbitration 
idea appeared so practical that authorities at the Iowa Agricultural Exper­
iment Station at Ames, recognized it in early 1933, as an important means 
by which farmers could achieve some adjustment of their burdensome debts. ^ 
The CounciL of Defense concept emerged quickly in Plymouth County as 
desperate farmers sought to ward off foreclosure.
On December 26, 1932, the LeMars Globe-Post announced that Plymouth 
County could expect an "avalanche" of foreclosure sales if the agricultural
fa
situation persisted. 3 On Dec ember 27, some farmers in Plymouth County, 
headed by Sam Mosher, formed their Council of Defense and addressed the 
task of negotiating mortgage debt s. ^  The history of the Plymouth County 
version of the Council of Defense was short and stormy.
An ambiguous relationship existed between the Farmers* Holiday Asso­
ciation and the Council of Defense in Plymouth County. The Sioux City 
Journal reported that many members of the Council of Defense were also
^Prescott, "An Iowa Foreclosure," p. 198*
^Murray and Bentley, The Agricultural Emergency In Iowa, p. 8U.
^ LeMars Globe-Post, December 26, 1932.
6**Sioux City Journal, January 9, 1933.
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Farm Holiday members. The newspaper cautioned, however, that "the Council 
I3 functioning separately from the holiday group."^5 Further Journal re- 
ports suggested that the Council of Defense was a separate organization 
with a body of ten officers and directors.^ Substantiation for this sep­
arate organization theory appeared in a LeMars Globe-Post story. The 
LeMars newspaper referred to the Council of Defense as an arm of a group 
entitled the Farmers* Protective Association. According to this account, 
the Council was the ten-member foreclosure negotiating body for the Pro­
tective Association.^ One indication that the Council of Defense operated 
as a distinct and separate body from the Farmers* Holiday Association cen­
ters on the fact that C. J. Schultz, Holiday chief in Plymouth County, 
received recognition as only a member of the Council. He was not listed 
as an officer or director in the Council of Defense.^® Yet, when Schultz 
communicated with Reno on January 7* 1933, he wrote of "our defense Council," 
and stated, "we have got up speed, nothing can stop us n o w . T h e  tone 
of Schultz* letter suggests that the local Holiday Association controlled 
the Council.
Despite the ambiguous relationship between the Council and the Holiday 
Association alluded to in the local press, two points seem reasonably clear.
^^Ibid., January 8, 1933.
66Ibid.
^ LeMars Globe-Post, January 5, 1933. This story is the only reference 
to the Farmers* Protective Association in Plymouth County. Earlier a Farm­
ers* Protective Association formed during the "Cow War" in Cedar County,
Iowa, in 1931. Shover, Combelt Rebellion, pp. 31—33.
ro
0 LeMars Globe-Post, January 9, 1933.
J. Schultz to Milo Reno, January 7, 1933, Reno Papers.
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First , the Council operated as the anti-foreclosure body of the local Holi­
day movement and as such could gather large numbers of farmers to halt fore­
closure sales when negotiations failed. Second, even though formal Holiday 
leadership deteriorated during the anti-foreclosure movement, there existed 
an informal leadership and coordination in the activities of protesting 
farmers in Plymouth County. A detailed discussion of the history of the 
Council of Defense illuminates the importance of this segment of the 1930s 
farm revolt.
The membership of the Farmers* Holiday Association and the Council of 
Defense clearly overlapped. The only available lists of Council members 
reveal that most were also involved with the Holiday group.7^ Sam Mosher, 
for example, helped organize the Sioux City Milk Producers* Association, 
and held membership in the Farmers* Holiday. In addition, Mosher served 
as chairman of the, Plymouth County Council of Defense during the anti- 
foreclosure period.71
The Plymouth County Council of Defense attained notable success in 
its early phase of operation. In the first two weeks of existence, more
than a dozen foreclosures were settled by bringing creditors and debtors
72together for agreeable talks. The most spectacular achievement of the 
Council occurred on January U, 1933, when an estimated 800 farmers stopped
7°Sioux City Journal. January 8, 1933; and LeMars Globe-Post, January 
9, 1933.
77Dyson, "The Farm'Holiday Movement," p. 80; and Sioux City Joumal, 
January 8, 1933.
72C. J. Schultz to Milo Reno, January 7» 1933, Reno Papers.
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a foreclosure sale and forced a New York insurance company to raise its 
bid on a piece of farm sale property. Potential bidders were silenced by 
the crowd of farmers and the representative of the insurance company was 
threatened with lynching unless he agreed to wire the company for a change 
in their bid.^ Three days later the presence of 1000 farmers convinced 
officials to cancel another foreclosure sale.T*4 In praise of these bold 
direct actions, Milo Reno wrote to Lawrence Casper, Plymouth County Holi­
day and Council member, that, "you boys have done more to put the Farmers*
Holiday on the map and fix it there for the future than any other group in
75the United States." Reno’s praiseworthy remarks were based on the illu­
sion that what had happened in Plymouth County signaled the resurgence of 
Farmers* Holiday activism* To the contrary, what had happened in Plymouth 
County was a brief moment in the spotlight before serious organizational 
problems wrecked the local Farmers* Holiday Association and the Council 
of Defense, and destroyed the driving force of the area's farm revolt.
From the beginning, the Plymouth County Council of Defense apparently 
lacked strong formal leadership. On January 1, 1933, the Council massed 
its members in LeMars to prevent a tax sale. Reports indicated that UOO 
to 500 farmers attended and halted the sale. With the sale halted an 
independent group of farmers, led by Morris Cope and Charles Lite, sought 
signatures on a petition asking for a moratorium on debts and a repeal of 
the deficiency law. The petition was to be forwarded to the Iowa governor
^%ew York Times, January 5, 1933, p. lU; and LeMars Globe-Post  ^
January 5, 1933.
^ LeMars Globe-Post, January 9, 193?.
75m11o Reno to Lawrence Casper, January 6, 1933, Reno Papers.
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for action. Although the idea of the petition may have been agreeable, 
the organizers were not the formal leaders of the local Holiday group or 
Council of Defense.^
Three days later, after the Holiday group and the Council of Defense 
assembled their farmer members and forced the Hew York insurance company 
to raise bids on a piece of property* another independent action occurred. 
Operating without the sanction of local farm leaders, a group of farmers 
marched on a LeMars implement shop and attempted to reclaim a repossessed 
tractor. The tractor incident developed impulsively and, although tempo- 
rarily threatening, proved ineffective because the implement dealer locked
his doors, ignored the farmers* protests, and later reopened without inci-
77dent. ' Events of this nature were symptomatic of what one farm leader 
meant when he told a reporter that "sometimes the boys get out of hand."^®
The lack of clear leadership and organizational control of the "boys” 
grew throughout January. Approximately 1000 farmers gathered to prohibit 
a tax sale on January 7° With the sale postponed * the farmers then held a 
rally on the courthouse lawn. Ella Reeve Bloor, from Sioux City, addressed 
the crowd and urged them to organize a march and demonstration at the state 
capitol. Probably unknown to the local farmers at the time was Bloor rs 
position as local farm organizer for the Communist Party. A petition of 
support for Bloor*s suggested march and demonstration circulated and received 
many farmers* signatures. Later C. J. Schultz, speaking for the Farmers*
^LeMars Globe-Post, January 2, 1933.
77
Sioux City Journal. January 5* 1933* p. 2. A possible precedent for 
this action may have been set by farmers in Newman Grove, Nebraska, one- 
hundred miles southwest of LeMars, when Nebraska Holiday members reclaimed 
two repossessed trucks on October 6, 1932. Shover, Cornbelt Rebellion, p. 72.
Sioux City Journal. January 8, 1933, p. 2.
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Holiday, indicated that his group would "he better served if ve stay right 
here and watch Plymouth County.’1 In fact, while the mass of farmers gath­
ered outside the courthouse for Bloor’s speech, Schultz and the Council of 
Defense met in the judge's chambers to negotiate another foreclosure case.T9 
At this point the formal Holiday leadership and divergent elements of the 
local organization appeared to be moving in different directions.
The loss of leadership by Schultz, Mosher, and other local heads of 
the Holiday movement worsened as the winter progressed. On the day of the 
courthouse rally, a small group of farmers went to the local Farm Bureau 
office in LeMars and, claiming "We’re the law hereJ" told the county agent 
to get out of town. The feeling was that the agent had been unfair in 
administering federal feed and seed loans.®® On the same day, a group of 
farmers surrounded and threatened the representatives of the LeMars Semi- 
Weekly Sentinel who were covering the rally. Reportedly, the farmers de­
manded, upon threat of lynching that the Sentinel change its position and 
take a more favorable stance on the farmers' movement.
By late January, a group of farmers operating independently, employed 
a new technique in which they approached landlords and businessmen and 
demanded the surrender of debt notes against farmers. The Council of
79LeMars Globe-Post, January 9* 1933. A picture along with the names 
of the Council of Defense that met that day appeared in the paper. Noticeably 
absent was Morris Cope whose name has surfaced many times as an informal 
leader of farmers in Plymouth County. One can only speculate that this known 
activist was probably in the crowd of farmers on the courthouse lawn on Jan­
uary 7.
®®Ibid.; and Prescott, "An Iowa Foreclosure," p. 199.
^ LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel. January 10, 1933.
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Defense claimed no knowledge of such activities.8^ On January 25, the 
sale of a house in LeMars itself was halted hy farmers, indicating further 
hold actions.88 The local organizational leadership seemingly lost control 
as independent factions in the county went their own direction. By this 
time, it appeared that the local Holiday organization had no well-defined 
purpose or direction. Combined with a lack of solid leadership, the local 
movement suffered from impulsive actions by independent groups of farmers.
In the spring of 1933, an extremely activist faction of farmers dom­
inated the rebellion in Plymouth County. A long pending foreclosure suit 
threatened Ed Durband with eviction from his farm northwest of LeMars. On 
March 23, the local Council of Defense, suggesting that the mortgage holder 
had been reasonable with Durband, voted to give up on its attempt to settle 
the case.8** But a separate group of farmers, at least thirty to forty 
strong, ignored the Council’s decision and attempted to prevent Durband’s 
eviction. When the county sheriff ordered the farmers guarding the farm 
to clear the way for eviction, he was informed that the Council of Defense 
did not bind them. The local press covering the developments reported that 
an apparently new informal group of farmers had organized.8  ^ This new 
group demonstrated their strength by preventing the eviction of Durband
v
^ LeMars Globe-Post, January 23, 1933.
0-3
Ibid., January 26, 1933; and Iowa Union Farmer, February 8, 1933.
In this case farmers acted to protect the house of a dentist who graciously 
extended payments for farmers who owed him for services.
8**LeMars Globe-Post, March 23, 1933.
85Ibid., March 27, 1933.
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os
for a month.00 John Le Moine, one farmer who participated in the Durband 
episode, believed that the faction was led by two or three radicals whom 
he did not identify.^
In late April, this more radical faction of the Plymouth County farm 
movement planned and executed a series of protests that briefly demonstrated 
their influence, but seriously damaged the local Farmers* Holiday Associa­
tion. On April 27, a crowd of 200 to 300 Plymouth County farmers went to 
Primghar, in O’Brien County to stop a foreclosure sale.88 A hint that the 
demonstration was well-planned surfaced when O’Brien County’s leading news­
paper later revealed a letter it had received, suggesting that its presence 
at Primghar on April 27, would get a good story.8^ Harold Rohwer, arrested 
after the Primghar incident for his involvement in a fight with deputies, 
later testified that O’Brien County farmers would have handled the fore­
closure suit peacefully, "but the bunch from LeMars came up and started a 
fight."9® Trial testimony later identified Morris Cope of Kingsley as the 
leader of the Plymouth County contingent-.91
Following the affair at Primghar, the farmers went to the Durband farnr 
and then on to LeMars where they attacked Judge Bradley.^ Again, the
8%bid., April 16, 1933.
8 ^LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, May 12, 1933.
88Q*Brien County Bell. May 3, 1933.
8q
^LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, June 9, 1933.
^ O ’Brien County Bell, May 10, 1933.
^ LeMars Sami-Weekly Sentinel, June 9, 1933.
^ LeMars Globe-Post. May 1, 1933.
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attack on Bradley appeared planned. A newspaper reported that Morris Cope, 
speaking to the crovd earlier in the day at Primghar, urged the farmers to 
"go to LeMars and get Judge B r a d l e y . " ^  Later trial testimony confirmed 
that Cope had led the violent attack on the judge.9**
Milo Reno was quick to condemn the violence in Plymouth and O'Brien, 
C o u n t i e s i n  fact, he contended that outside influences, particularly 
Communists, were the cause of such violent tactics.96 But Reno was mis­
taken, and his Judgement revealed his lack of insight into the workings of 
the organization he had fathered. The LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel edito­
rialized:
When the farm strike "brought defiance of law and order and dis­
regard of the rights of others and failed to bring any relief 
many of these representative farmers severed active connection 
with the organization and its leadership passed into the hands 
of a small group of men whose unlawful actions culminated in the 
disgraceful affair last T h u r s d a y .97
Some support for the Sentinelr s opinion exists. The LeMars Globe-Post
thoroughly and accurately reported the events of April 27 and subsequent
developments. In its coverage, the violence of that day was in no way
linked to the Farmers* Holiday Association or the Council of D e f e n s e . 98
Although some of those later arrested and convicted were members of both
93ieMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, June 9, 1933.
9**LeMars Globe-Post, July 20, 1933.
95shover» Combelt Rebellion, p. 12U.
96Farm Holiday News. July, 1933.
97LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, May 3, 1933.
9^LeMars Globe-Post, May and June, 1933.
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organizations, they probably did not represent those farmer groups on that 
fateful day in late April.
The actions of the radical faction of fanners seriously damaged Plym­
outh County farmers* organized efforts to deal with the depression. Holiday 
and Council leaders, although not involved in the April 27 violence, were 
arrested under martial law authority placed on the county. Sweeping arrests 
of many of those involved with the Holiday resulted. Sam Mosher, chairman 
of the Council of Defense, was arrested on April 29." A week later au­
thorities arrested C. J. Schultz, head of the local Farmers* Holiday Asso­
ciation.100 Ironically, while the leaders of the formal organizations were 
imprisoned, Morris Cope, an identified leader of the more radical farmers* 
faction, remained in hiding until he turned himself in on July 19.101 Dam­
aged by a small faction*s violent behavior and the resultant martial law 
decree, the local farm movement collapsed in early May, 1933.
Shover concludes that the spontaneous activity in the farm strike and 
anti-foreclosure movement gave the Holiday Association its driving force.
In Plymouth County, bold, planned actions by a group of farmers led pri­
marily by Morris Cope gave the local Holiday its driving force. When this 
element fell prey to martial law, the county’s organization lost its momen­
tum. During the two months following the Bradley incident, neither the 
previously faithful Globe-Post nor the Sentinel reported anything on Holiday
" ibid. , May 1, 1933.
lOOffew York Times, May 6, 1933, p. 6.
101LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, July 21, 1933.
102Shover, Combelt Rebellion, p. 166.
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103activities. At least one of these local newspapers had previously 
granted generous attention to the farmers* movement. Ostensibly* in May 
and June, 1933» there was nothing to report as the Plymouth County Farmers* 
Holiday Association ceased to function as a viable farmers* movement.
103LeMars Globe-Post, May and June, 1933I a^d LeMars Semi-Weekly 
Sentinel, May and June, 1933.
CHAPTER V
WHO REVOLTED?
Immediately after the violence in Plymouth County on April 27, 1933, 
speculation mounted as to who was involved in the rural uprising. Iowa 
Governor Clyde Herring proclaimed martial law in the county, declaring 
"Sioux City hoodlums were in the crowd that attacked the Judge." Within 
a week of the near-lynching, Park A. Findley, who as head of the Iowa Bu­
reau of Investigation was dispatched to LeMars to investigate the farm 
violence, claimed "red "backing" existed in the local upheaval. Charges 
of Communist involvement had surfaced as early as the farm strike in the 
autumn of 1932. Despite the concerns about outside influences, available 
evidence suggests that the farm revolt in Plymouth County comprised a move­
ment of and by local farmers.
National press coverage of the rural revolt is helpful in determining 
the farmer composition of the uprising in Plymouth County. Writing for 
ScribnerT s, Josephine Herbst visited the picket lines around Sioux City 
during the farm strike in the late summer of 1932, and found the picketers 
to be local farmers.** Remley Glass, a small town northwest Iowa lawyer 
during the 1930s, wrote an article for Harper*s on the agrarian insurgency.
-^New York Times, April 29, 1933, p. 1.
^LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, May 2, 1933-
•^Ibid., September 16, 1932.
^Herbst, "Feet In The Grass Roots,” pp. U6-51.
93
9h
He found the activists in the uprising to he farmers threatened by economic 
depression.^ Humors had circulated that the farm activists vere actually 
outsiders. Based on these rumors, Philip Stevenson, representing Common 
Sense, visited the cornbelt and attended farm meetings. Stevenson re­
ported that tfthe strikers vere not hums, not agitators, hut farmers
£
threatened with losing their land.”
Local newspaper reports also confirmed the fact that those involved 
in the rural rebellion were area farmers. After the major confrontation 
between six-hundred pickets and fifty law enforcement officials at James, 
Iowa, on September 7, 1932, rumors circulated that Sioux City agitators 
caused this most serious of the farm strike incidents.^ However, only 
two newspaper reporters, one from the LeMars Globe-Post and one from the 
Sioux City Journal, neared the picket line that day. The editor of the 
LeMars paper announced that ”the men who held the picket line yesterday
o
were practically all real farmers. I know because I know them personally.’ 
The Sioux City Journal confirmed the presence of local farmers at the 
James incident and reported discussions with farmers- involved.^
Prominent observers of the most serious and violent incident of the 
agricultural rebellion in Plymouth County also concluded that the insur­
gency consisted of local farmers. Commenting on the arrests after the
^Glass, ’’Gentlemen, The Corn Belt!” pp. 199-209.
^Stevenson, ’’Reno’s Cost of Production," p. 11.
L^eMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, September 9» 1932.
^LeMars Globe-Post, September 8, 1932.
^Sioux City Journal. September 8, 1932.
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attack on Judge Bradley, Wallace Short attested to the character of those 
involved. Short, a one-time mayor of Sioux City, an Iova legislator, a 
minister, and publisher of the local labor newspaper, the Unionist and 
Public Forum, mingled among those arrested and later held in a LeMars 
stockade. Short knew the men to be farmers. He is reported to have said 
that because of the arrests of local farmers, "at least two Sunday schools 
will be without superintendents."^-® Another report that the f^ arm rebel­
lion consisted of farmers came from a prominent Plymouth County politician. 
Gustave Alesch, Plymouth County farmer and representative in the Iowa 
Legislature, attributed the Bradley incident to mob psychology, but noted 
that the mob of attackers were local farmers. Finally, R. F. Starzl, 
editor of the LeMars Globe-Post. attested to the farmer composition of the 
rebellion in the county. Starzl had followed the mob that assaulted Judge 
Bradley from the courthouse to the site of the near-lynching. The editor 
later testified in court that he recognized many of the men present and 
knew them to be farmers.
The fact that arrests during the farm strike of August and September, 
1932, failed to turn up any outsiders, seems to verify the farmer element 
in the agricultural uprising. The first arrests for blockading highways 
in the Sioux City area occurred on September 13. The Sioux City Journal 
announced the arrest of five men; all were farmers from the territory
■^®Mrs. Wallace M. Short, Just One American, (Sioux City: By the Author,
19^3), p. 15U.
-^Roland S. White, Milo Reno: Farmers1 Union Pioneer, (Iowa City:
Athens Press, 19^1), pp. 1^8-i+9.
1^LeMars Globe-Post, July 20, 1933, p. 6.
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surrounding Sioux City.^-3 a few days later the first mass arrest of pick­
ets occurred as officials attempted to clear the highways around Sioux City. 
Hinety arrests resulted and these picketers were detained in the Woodbury 
County Jail in Sioux City. This group consisted of men from the area sur­
rounding Sioux City, including Plymouth County. Of the group of ninety 
picketers arrested, a reporter discovered that, "five were farm owners; 
twenty had owned farms and were now renters; twenty-five had always been 
renters; fifteen were farm boys living with their parents; seventeen were 
farm laborers long living in the community; and there were eight packing 
house employees."^
The arrest record for Plymouth County further substantiates the farm­
er composition of the 1930s agrarian rebellion. The first arrests in 
Plymouth County followed the near-lynching of Judge Bradley. Because of 
conflicting reports, -it is difficult to determine the exact number of 
arrests. On May 3, following the attack, the New York Times announced
that 105 men were in custody.^ However, on the next day the LeMars
16Globe-Post reported a total of only sixty-nine arrested. Probably 
the New York paper included all the arrests in Plymouth and O’Brien 
Counties, both of which experienced violence in the farm revolt on April 
27. On May 6, the Des Moines Register recorded ninety-two arrested in 
Plymouth County alone and identified them all as farmers.1^ Generally,
3-3sjoux City Journal, September lU, 1932.
^Vorse, "Rebellion In The Cornbelt," p.
-^5New York Times, May 3, 1933, p. 8.
^6LeMars Globe-Post, May 1933.
3-7Pes Moines Register, May 6, 1933, p. 1.
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however, there was -uncertainty in the actual number arrested. Even the 
local Globe-Post account of sixty-nine arrests is unclear, because pub­
lished reports provided far fewer than sixty-nine names. This much is 
certain: by cross-referencing local press coverage of actions after the
-assault on the Judge, a total of thirty-eight Plymouth County residents 
were named. Some of the arrests were not made until more than two months 
after the incident because of successful evasion by at least two individ­
uals.^-® Important Plymouth County court records are missing for pertinent 
cases relative to the April 27* assault. Thus, the Criminal Court files 
of Morris Cope, Ed Casper, Martin Rosburg, and Dick Popken are missing. 
These men all received convictions on various assault charges. ^  Further­
more, most of the arrests occurred while Plymouth County was under declara­
tion of martial law. Therefore, the Iowa National Guard was in charge of 
all arrests during a two week period. Two previous scholars of the farm 
rebellion, John Shover and Lowell Dyson, were unable to locate the National
pn
Guard records of this incident. So, a compilation of newspaper reports 
provides the available arrest evidence. Of the thirty-eight persons ar­
rested in Plymouth County, all were identified as farm owners, farm renters,
Pior farm hands.
•*-®LeMars Globe-Post, May 1, U, 29, July 13, and 20, 1933; LeMars Semi- 
Weekly Sentinel, May 12, and June 1, 1933; and Sioux City Journal, May 1,
3, and 11, 1933.
■^Plymouth County Criminal Court Records, Canes 782 A, 789 A, 791 A, 
and 792 A, Court House, LeMars, Iowa.
^®Shover, Cornbelt Rebellion, p. 121.
glLeMars Globe-Post, May 1, li, 29, and July 13 and 20, 1933; LeMars 
Semi-Weekly Sentinel, May 12 and June 1, 1933; and Sioux City Journal, May 
1 , 3, and 11, 1933.
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An examination of the people associated in some way with the Farm
Holiday movement from August, 1932, to May, 1933* further documents the
farming status of those involved in the rebellion. By utilizing local
newspaper coverage of the farm strike in August and September, 1932; the
anti-foreclosure sale campaign of January and February, 1933; an<l the
assault on Judge Bradley and subsequent arrests in April and May, 1933*
an interesting pattern emerges. Newspaper reports about organizational
meetings, leaders, committee members, incidents of farm activism, and
arrests revealed sixty different names in some way associated with the
Plymouth County farmers' rebellion. Of the sixty names, fifty-six were
Plymouth County farmers or farm workers. Three were farmers from neigh- 
22boring counties. Only one person actively involved or associated with 
the rebellion appeared to be an outsider. That person was Mother Ella 
Reeve Bloor, reportedly from Sioux City, and formerly from North Dakota. 
Ironically, Mother Bloor's position as a prominent figure in the Communist 
Party escaped the attention of local newspapers. Although Bloor was present
23in LeMars, she apparently did not have a substantial impact on area farmers.
One final indication of the presence of local farmers in the 1930s 
rebellion in Plymouth County can be found in the conviction and sentence 
record for those arrested in the Bradley incident. Although thirty-eight
22LeMars Globe-Post, August and September, 1932, and January, February, 
April, and May, 1933; and LeMars Semi-tfeekly Sentinel, August and September, 
1932, and January and May, 1933*
^ LeMars Globe-Post, January 9* 1933; and John L. Shover, "The Commu­
nist Party and the Midwest Farm Crisis of 1933*” Journal of American 
History 51 (September, 1964): 255• Bloor, along with Harold Ware and
Lem Harris, provided the nucleus of a Communist effort to lead the farm 
revolt. A more complete discussion of Communist involvement in the 
Plymouth County revolt is found in Chapter VI of this study.
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vere arrested, only twelve vere convicted in subsequent legal p r o c e e d i n g s .2^ 
Three of the twelve vere cited for contempt of court and sentenced to one
day in jail with fines of $50.^ Seven received suspended jail sentences
26of varying Lengths on different assault charges. Only two, Morris Cope
and A. A. Mitchell, served lengthy jail sentences. Cope received one year
in the state penitentiary, paroled to the local county sheriff to serve his
27time with the opportunity for release time to complete farm work. Mitchell
oftreceived thirty days in the county jail and served his time fully* All 
of these men vere local farmers, and, in view of the number of eyewitnesses 
-available to testify against them, the limited number of convictions and 
the frequency of suspended sentences suggests leniency by local officials.29 
Although the farm rebellion in Plymouth County consisted almost exclu­
sively of local farmers, they represented only a minority of the farm popu­
lation in the county. In 1932 there vere 823 farm owners, 272 part-owners, 
and 1770 tenants in Plymouth County. This total number of 2865 farmers for 
1932 does not account for any hired farm laborers."3® Farm population data 
and reports of farmer activism demonstrates a distinct minority of the
^ LeMars Globe-Post May 29 and July 13, 1933; LeMars Semi-Weekly 
Sentinel, July 21, 1933; and Des Moines Register, June 28, 1933, p. 16.
^LeMars Globe-Post, July 13, 1933.
^ Ibid., May 29, 1933; and LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, July 21, 1933* 
^LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, July 21, 1933.
28pes Moines Register, .June 28, 1933, p. l6.
29a further indication of leniency surfaced in a search of the Plym­
outh County Sheriff's Department records. A letter found there, written by 
Sheriff Rippey to Governor Herring on June 12,.1931+, requested a reduction 
of Morris Cope's sentence. Plymouth County Sheriff's Department Criminal 
Files, Number 105, Ed Casper and Morris Cope, Court House, LeMars, Iova.
30uSDA, Iova Agricultural Statistics, Plymouth County, p. h o .
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county’s agrarian element involved in the rebellion. That a small percent­
age of the county’s farmers participated in the revolt is not surprising. 
Such a condition is probably not unusual, in protest movements. But, an 
examination of the numbers of farmers involved reveals much about the na­
ture of the brief rebellion in Plymouth County.
The largest reported group of farm pickets during the strike of 
August and September, 1932, was 1000 to 1500, guarding the roads near 
James on the night of August lU and 15.^ If the maximum number of this 
press estimate was actually present, it would have indicated slightly over 
50 percent of Plymouth County’s farmers involved in at least one picketing 
incident. However, farmers from the surrounding counties of Woodbury in 
Iowa, and Union in South Dakota, helped swell the picket lines.^ There­
fore , even at the largest gathering of protesting farmers during the strike 
only a minority of Plymouth County’s 2865 farmers were involved.
At the most violent incident of the farm strike, less than one-fourth 
of the county’s farmers participated. On September 7, at the "Battle of 
James," a convoy of trucks escorted by deputies attempted to break the 
farmers' blockade. The LeMars Globe-Post estimated approximately 600 
farmers at the incident with another U00 onlookers.33 if a n  those pres­
ent were from Plymouth County, a fact which seems improbable, they would 
have represented approximately 20 percent of the county's farmers.
-^-LeMars Globe-Post, August 15, 1932.
^ Sioux City Journal, August 15, 1932.
^LeMars Globe-Post, September 8, 1932.
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Reports of large gatherings of farmers also emerged during the anti­
foreclosure sale movement in the winter of 1932-33. On January 2, 1933, 
**00 to 500 farmers massed to halt a tax sale in LeMars. Five days later, 
1000 farmers met and halted a foreclosure s a l e . 3 ^
Reports vary on the number of people involved in the near-lynching of 
Judge Bradley. A neighboring county newspaper claimed that 600 to 1000 
men were present at the incident,35 -but one of the LeMars newspapers esti­
mated that only 200 to 300 men participated.3^ Perhaps most indicative 
of the number involved in the assault was the report, when martial law had 
been declared, that the National Guard had the names of 250 men present at 
bhe attack.
Suggestive of the small portion of farmers involved in the rebellion 
were the names of the fifty-six Plymouth County activists whose names ap­
peared in print because of some association with the agrarian u p r i s i n g . 3 ®  
These men constituted only about 2 percent of the farmers in the county.
Based on available evidence, the farm revolt in Plymouth County was 
a distinct minority movement. On most occasions, only 10 to 12 percent 
of the area farmers could be counted at meetings and incidents of agrarian 
rebellion. And only 2 to 3 percent were specifically named in the
3^LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, January 3 and 10, 1933.
35o*Brien County Bell, May 3, 1933.
3^LeMars Semi,-Weekly Sentinel, May 2, 1933.
37LeMars Globe-Post, May U, 1933.
38lbid., August and September, 1932, and January, February, April, and 
May, 1933; and LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, August and September, 1932, and 
January and May, 1933.
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newspapers. But it is a rare activist movement that attracts major numbers. 
The mere physical -assembly of large groups of farmers, ranging from 200 to 
1500 in number, for purposes of striking, protesting, and stopping aales, 
indicates the strength of the Farm Holiday movement in the county. More­
over, on a comparable basis, the number of participants in Plymouth County 
is significant. In his study of the farm revolt, Shover found no other 
locality that surpassed Plymouth County in numbers of farmers actively 
involved in rebellion incidents. Shover has also noted that Plymouth rank­
ed second in frequency of incidents of farmer activism.39 Even though a 
minority of the county’s farmers participated in the agrarian movement, 
they did so with notoriety and an effectiveness that placed Plymouth in the 
center of the 1930s farm rebellion.
The geographical distribution of farmers involved in the Plymouth 
County rebellion provides further insight into the county's farm movement. 
Utilizing the 193^ Plymouth County Atlas and Farm Directory and newspaper 
reported addresses, a reasonably accurate distribution of farmer activists 
can be attained. Of the fifty-six names that appeared in press reports 
during the rebellion, fifty-two were located. Map 5 on the following page 
demonstrates the approximate geographical distribution of the farmer par­
ticipants in the rebellion.
The most outstanding characteristic of the distribution of rebellious 
farmers was its concentration in the southeastern section of Plymouth
39shover, Combelt Rebellion, pp. 3-U6.
^ LeMars Globe-Post, August and September, 1932, and January and May, 
1933; and 193^ Plymouth County Atlas and Farm Directory, (Sioux City: The
Great Western Map Company, 193V), pp. 1-25. The Atlas and Farm Directory, 
provides data for the year 1933.
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County. Thirty-two of the fifty-two located farmers came from the six 
southeastern townships of the county, with Stanton and Henry townships 
accounting for eighteen of the identified farmers. Such heavy concentra­
tion in one area suggests special circumstances in that portion of the 
county.
To further substantiate the location of identified farmer activists 
in southeastern Plymouth County, an examination of the arrest record fol­
lowing the assault on Judge Bradley is helpful. Thirty-eight names of 
arrested farmers appeared in local newspaper coverage after the attack.
The county-wide distribution of the arrested farmers is illustrated on 
Map 6. Out of the total of thirty-eight reported arrested farmers, thirty- 
five have been located. The residences of seventeen of the located farm­
ers were in the six southeastern townships of the county. Eleven of those
arrested resided in the previously mentioned townships of Stanton and 
liPHenry. When compared with the areas of most organizational activity 
(see Map 4), and number of participants in various phases of the rebellion, 
the arrest distribution further suggests the concentration of rebellious 
farmers in southeastern Plymouth County.
Twelve convictions resulted from the investigation and trials of those 
involved in Bradley*s assault. Three were given minor contempt citations. 
Nine men were convicted on various assault charges. Once again the area 
of residence of this activist element was the southeastern section of the
^LeMars Globe-Post, May 1, 1+, 19* July 13, and 20, 1933; LeMars Semi- 
Weekly Sentinel, May 12, and June 1, 1933; and Sioux City Journal, May 1,
3, and 11, 1933.
^ Ibid.; and 193*+ Plymouth County Atlas and Farm Directory, pp. 1-25.
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county. Five of the convicted men lived in the townships of Stanton, Lin­
coln, or U n i o n .  **3 Thus, in terms of arrests, southeastern Plymouth County 
also seemed to be the center of farmer activism.
Perhaps the key to the Plymouth County farm rebellion, centered in the 
southeastern section of the county, is found in the land-holding status of 
participating farmers. Shover found, by way of thirty-five personal in­
terviews, that survivors of the farm uprising were almost unanimous in their 
belief that the movement was one of property holders.^ But based on the 
land-owning situation in Plymouth County, some revision of Shover*s inter­
pretation may be in order. Relying on the list of fifty-six farmers, prop­
erty-holding was not common to rebellious farmers in Plymouth County.^5 
Only thirteen of the reported farmers owned land in 1933, among them were 
C. JV Schultz, I. W. Reck, and Morris Cope. Yet, these men held leadership 
positions in the Farmers* Holiday Association, the milk strike, or in spon­
taneous incidents during the rebellion. Of the three, only Schultz held a 
sizable amount of land, claiming 266 acres.^ The thirteen property-holding 
farm activists were relatively large land holders, averaging 230 acres each 
in 1933.^ In that year, the average size farm in the county was only 190 
acres.1*® Nine of the thirteen property holders resided in the six
**3rbia.
^Shover, ’’Communist Party and the Midwest Farm Crisis of 1933," pp. 
2U8-U9. Shover travelled the area of the farm rebellion in 19^1 and located 
and interviewed survivors.
**5l93H Plymouth County Atlas and Farm Directory, pp. 1-25.
^ Ibid., p. IT, 1 8, and 25.
^Tlbid.« p. 12, lU, and 23.
^^USDA, Iowa Yearbook of Agriculture, 1933, p. 222.
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southeastern townships of the county; seven maintained their land in Stan­
ton and Henry townships. ^  Shover*s contention of a property holder’s 
rebellion does not fit the evidence from Plymouth County. However, perhaps 
the small element of property holding farmers mentioned above provided im­
portant leadership in the local revolt.
Of the forty-three non-property holders involved in some way in the 
rebellion, thirty-nine were located. Map 7 on the following page shows the 
distribution of non-propertied rebellious farmers in Plymouth County.^
The concentration in the southeastern part of the county is again noteworthy. 
However, since a relatively large number of participants were non-property 
holders, the suggestion of a rebellion by propertied people threatened with 
loss of property is called into question. Hon-propertied fanners were cer­
tainly afflicted by the depression, but were not threatened with loss of 
land. What, then, motivated direct action and rebellion among this group 
of farmers?
Perhaps the answer to the above question lies in the farming status of 
many of the forty-three non-propertied rebellious farmers in Plymouth County. 
Sixteen of the non-propertied class farmed with or for their parents. Map 
8 shows the distribution of those farmers with a connection to their parent’s
land. Most of this group resided in the southeastern portion of the coun­
ty. ^  It seems reasonable to assume that these farmers normally would have
^^193U Plymouth County Atlas and Farm Directory, pp. 12-25.
5^Ibid», pp. 1-25; and LeMars Globe-Post, August and September, 1932,
and January, February, April, and May, 1933; and LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, 
August and September, 1932, and January and May, 1933.
^19 3k Plymouth County Atlas and Farm Directory, pp. 1-25.
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inherited their parent’s property at some future date. In Plymouth County 
in the 1930s, this situation presented special circumstances that contrib­
uted to some of the most serious agrarian rebellion.
Two previous studies of the farm revolt concluded that the average 
age of participating farmers exceeded forty. Frank Dileva found that the
r   -------------------------------------------------------------------- -— -       -
age of rebellious farmers in the many scattered incidents of the Iowa 
rebellion averaged U2.5 years.^ Shover determined, through a question­
naire distributed in the early 1960s, that the average age of former Farm-
c o
ers' Holiday respondents was U3.5 years. But, based on the list of the 
fifty-six identified Plymouth County activists, a somewhat younger age for 
rebellious farmers emerges. Ages were given for sixteen of the identified 
men. The average newspaper reported age for these rebellious farmers was 
3^ .5** With the ages of. less than one-third of the actively involved farm­
ers available, conclusions must obviously be tentative. Nevertheless, the 
fact that the average age for Plymouth County farmers seemingly differs 
as much as eight to nine years from earlier studies may be meaningful.
With parents twenty-five to thirty years their senior, farmers in line for 
parental lands may have already inherited the land or assumed general man­
agement of a farm by age forty-two or forty-three. However, a farmer at 
age thirty-four, working with his parents on a farm was likely to find the 
parents still actively involved in the operation. Thus, the relatively
^Dileva, "Farm Revolts," p. 108.
5^Shover, Combelt Rebellion, p. IT* Thirty-four former Holiday mem­
bers responded to Shover’s questionnaire.
5^LeMars Globe-Post, August and September, 1932, and January, February, 
April, and May, 1933; and LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, August and September, 
1932, and January and May, 1933. —
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young rebellious farmers in Plymouth County found themselves property- 
less and threatened not by the loss of their own land, but rather by 
the loss of a family farm which might some day be theirs. For more than 
one-fourth of the identified farmer activists in Plymouth County, the 
above potential threat posed real danger.^ The existence of farmers 
endangered in the described manner in a small section of the county estab­
lished an interesting combination of circumstances. In a restricted area 
of the county, important elements of the farm rebellion merged. Influen­
tial propertied farmers such as C. J. Schultz and I. W. Reck possessed 
leadership talents. In the same area, an element of relatively young, un- 
propertied farmers, who stood to inherit their parents’ land, were concen­
trated, Set against these human features, the southeastern part of the 
county received the most severe impact from the depressed agricultural 
conditions of 1930 to 1933* In this environment, propertied leaders, would- 
be land holders, and unpropertied farmers, all threatened with the loss of 
their livelihood, provided the human ingredient in the 1932-33 agricultural 
rebellion in Plymouth County.
The case of one particular Plymouth County farmer may be instructive 
in an attempt to fully comprehend the nature of those who rose in rebellion. 
Morris Cope was a successful farmer, seriously threatened by the depression. 
Although a member of the Farmers* Holiday Association, he operated as an 
independent agrarian rebel, and left an indelible mark on the 1932-33 farm­
ers* rebellion. Throughout the unrest, Cope always appeared at significant 
events even though he held no official position among the farmers. He
^Ibid.; and 193^ Plymouth County Atlas and Farm Directory, pp. l-25«
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apparently was the chief organizer in an attempt to blockade Plymouth
County farm produce from sale in Cherokee. Then, at a crossroads meeting
on August 30, 1932, Cope and others vere shot at for their organizing ef-
forts.^ In January, 1933, during the anti-foreclosure movement, he vas
among those vho circulated a petition for a moratorium on farm debts and
57urged a march on the state capitol in pursuit of such legislation. 1 On
April 27, 1933, prior to the assault on Judge Bradley, he led a group of
Plymouth County farmers to nearby Primghar, Iova, and sought to stop a
foreclosure sale. In a fight vith local sheriff’s deputies, Cope suffered
head injuries vhich later required medical attention.^® On the same day,
59he also reportedly led the attack on Judge Bradley of LeMars.  ^ After the 
assault on the judge, he avoided arrest for over tvo months. A Hartley,
Iova, doctor revealed that he had treated Cope’s head injury, after vhich 
Cope fled to South Dakota vith another suspect. Upon surrender, he vas 
convicted on assault charges, based on testimony that he vas the leader 
of the rebellious farmers in the attack on the judge. His sentence of one 
year in the state peniteniary, paroled to the county jail, vas the harshest 
sentence handed out for illegal actions on the part of rebellious farmers 
in Plymouth County.^ 1
5^Sioux City Journal, August 31, 1932.
5?LeMars Globe-Post, January 2, 1933.
5^LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, June 9, 1933.
59LeMars Globe-Post, July 20, 1933.
^Qsioux City Journal, May 1+ and 11, 1933.
^LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, July 21, 1933. A search of Plymouth 
County Sheriff’s Department records revealed tvo pieces of information of 
interest in the Cope case. First, on June 12, 193**, Sheriff Rippey requested 
a reduction for time served in Cope’s sentence vhich vas to run until August,
Ill
As a farmer, Cope had tasted success. He resided and farmed in Union 
township in southeastern Plymouth County, near the town of Kingsley. He 
owned only eighty acres of land himself, but farmed across the road from 
his father and younger brother. Cope was primarily a hog producer and 
apparently an ingenious operator. He invented a hog house door which re­
ceived a patent in July, 1933.^ Following the assault on Judge Bradley, 
a reporter from the Omaha World-Herald visited Cope’s father. The reporter 
found that Jacob Cope had farmed on the same location for twenty-five years 
as one of northwest Iowa’s most prosperous farmers. The Cope farmstead 
featured a large eighteen room house. Until just prior to the agricultural 
uprising^ Jacob Cope had held 550 acres of excellent farm land.^ However, 
on January 9, 1932, the elder Cope had 510 acres of mortgaged land fore­
closed.^ By the planting season of 1932, he had been reduced to forty 
acres of farm land because he could not meet mortgage and tax payments. 
Moreover, Cope was embittered because he had acquired his land immediately 
after World War I and felt the debts he incurred were honest debts. By 
1933, those debts had rendered him a poor and downcast man.^ The father
193*+. Second, a letter written on May 8, 1933, from C. W. McNaughton, state 
agent in charge of the Plymouth County investigation, to Park A. Findley, 
head of the Iowa Bureau of Criminal Investigations, suggests a protective 
attitude about local tenant farmers, and some informal leadership on Cope’s 
behalf. Cope wrote a letter threatening a Colorado tenant planning to move 
to Plymouth County. In later trial testimony, five witnesses acknowledged 
that the letter, signed by the Farmers* Holiday Association, was the work 
of Cope. Plymouth County Sheriff Department Criminal Files, File Number 
105 and 106, LeMars, Iowa.
^ 193^ Plymouth County Atlas and Farm Directory, pp. 18-19.
^LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, July U, 1933.
6**0maha World Herald, May 1, 1933, p. 2.
^ Plymouth County Transfer of Lands, Book Number 5, Court House, LeMars, 
Iowa, p. 6.
Omaha World Herald, May 1, 1933, p. 2.
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6*7hoped to leave his 550 acres unencumbered to his sons. ' But by 1932 and 
1933 there vas little left for inheritance. The father had seen much of a 
life’s work lost in a few short years. The son had seen his hope for the
future wiped out by depression conditions.
With this background, Morris Cope embarked on desperate actions in 
1933. Wallace Short later summarized what vas probably felt by Cope and 
others like him. Commenting on the agricultural rebellion and hard times, 
Short argued that "at such times men turn their backs on the question vhat
is legal, and act vith energy and conviction on their sense of vhat is
right. Certainly Morris Cope vas one of the most energetic of the rural 
insurgents of the 1930s. His case vas, if not representative, surely in- 
dicative of the desperation of activist farmers in Plymouth County.
In summary, then vho vere the men vho rebelled in the agrarian upris­
ing in Plymouth County? First and foremost, they vere local farmers, albeit 
a small percentage of the county’s agrarian population. Compared to the 
best estimates on the age of farmers throughout the midvest uprising, Plym­
outh County farmers identified as being involved in the rebellion vere 
relatively younger. Significantly, a majority of these individuals hailed 
from a concentrated area in the southeastern section of the county. Land 
owning vas not a common trait among them. However, more than one-fourth of 
those farmers involved appeared likely to inherit family property. Report­
ing on the farm crisis in 1933, Bruce Bliven concluded that those vho
^Tjames R. Parker, "The Farm Holiday Movement In Northwest Iowa," 
Unpublished Research Paper, Drake University, (Des Moines: Iova State
Historical Library, 1968), p. 38.
^®Short, Just One American, p. 1,53.
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rebelled were "farmers who had something a few years ago, and have had it
69suddenly taken away." This journalist's observation applied to Plymouth 
County. Although not all who rebelled were property holders threatened 
with loss of land, many saw their expectations for future property quickly 
dashed by the agricultural depression. This feature of property expecta­
tion on the part of an element of farm rebels in Plymouth County suggests
a qualification of Shover*s view that the 1930s farm rebellion was one of
70property holders.
^Bliven, "Milo Reno and His Farmers," p. 64. 
70Shover, Combelt Rebellion, p. 9*
CHAPTER VI
POLITICS OF REBELLION
An extended study of the farm xebellion in Plymouth County should 
treat important local political developments. Significant political de­
velopments in this county fall into two categories. Of primary importance, 
the county experienced a major change in voting behavior prior to and dur­
ing the years of agricultural discontent. Second, representatives of the 
Communist Party appeared in the county during the rebellion. Examination 
of these political factors may provide additional insight into the farm 
revolt in Plymouth County in 1932-33.
Iowa had been a traditionally Republican state and it voted overwhelm­
ingly in the Republican column in presidential elections from 1896 through 
1928.1 Reflecting this state-wide pattern, Plymouth County had also voted 
staunchly Republican since Populist days.^ Starting in 192**, signs of 
voter discontent emerged in the county, which lingered until the end of 
the decade. In the election of 1930, the county threw over its traditional 
Republican heritage in favor of the Democratic Party. Throughout the years
^Edgar Eugene Robinson, The Presidential Vote, 1898-1932, (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 193*0, p. 6l.
^Even in the 1892 election when the Populists fielded James B. Weaver 
as a candidate, Iowa voted strongly Republican and gave Weaver, a native 
son, less than 5 percent of its popular vote. John D. Hicks, The Populist 
Revolt, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 196l), p. 263.
II1*
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of the farm rebellion, Plymouth County retained its nevly found political 
a l i g n m e n t The political change in the county, strongly influenced by 
rural voters, reflected the stirrings of American agriculture in "the early 
1930s.
Americans elected Calvin Coolidge to the Presidency in 192^. The 
Republican scored almost a two-to-one margin of victory over Democratic 
candidate John Davis, while Progressive candidate Robert La Follette placed 
third.1* Iova voters also responded favorably to the Coolidge candidacy 
and gave him a tvo-to-one margin of victory. However, their second choice 
vas La Follette. Receiving over 100,000 votes less than "the Progressive 
candidate, Democrat John Davis finished third in Iova.'* Perhaps Iowa’s 
strong shoving for La Follette vas not so unusual. After all, as Arthur 
$4. Schlesinger, Jr. pointed out, the 192h Progressive campaign "centered 
its whole appeal around the farmers’ sense of inequality."^ Responding 
"to that appeal, five Iova counties voted a plurality for La Follette and 
another five counties narrowly voted a plurality for Coolidge over La 
Follette by less than two percentage points. Among the later group vas 
Plymouth County.^ Of these ten politically divergent counties, Plymouth 
and Crawford vere later significantly involved in the farm rebellion.
^Robinson, The Presidential Vote 1896-1932. pp. 83-85.
14John D. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy. 1921-1933. (New York: Harper-
Row, i960), p. 102.
^Whitney, Iova Official Register, 1925-26, p. 537.
^Schlesinger, Crisis of Old Order, p. 105.
^Whitney, Iova Official Register, 1925-26, pp. 536-37.
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Available evidence for Plymouth County suggests that the vote for La 
Follette vas primarily rural. In 192U, the county had thirty voting pre­
cincts. Eight of the precincts vere influenced or dominated by a sizable 
town population. The remaining tventy-tvo precincts vere almost exclu­
sively rural. In the 192k election, fifteen of the rural precincts voted 
a. plurality for La Follette, but only one of the eight tovn precincts
Q
voted a La Follette plurality. The noteworthy feature of the 192U elec­
tion in Plymouth County vas that a traditionally Republican county expe­
rienced a significant change in voter behavior. Rural areas dominated 
the political change in the county. The motivating force for the change 
van apparently agricultural discontent vhich ran deep enough to drive 
voters from Republican ranks. Hovever, voters did not cross over from 
Republican to Democrat , but rather crossed all the way over to a third 
political movement. The seeds of voter unrest vere thus apparent in Plym­
outh County by 192*+.
In 1928, Plymouth County continued to deviate from the Iova political 
mainstream. In that year the nation overwhelmingly elected Herbert Hoover 
to the presidency, giving him 58 percent of the popular vote.^ Strongly 
Republican Iowa provided Hoover 62 percent of its vote. Hovever, six 
counties in the Havkeye State voted a majority for the Democratic candi­
date, A1 Smith. Of the six, Audubon, Carrol, Crawford, Plymouth and Shelby 
vere in the vestern portion of the state. Only highly Catholic Dubuque 
County vas outside the area of strongest farm rebellion in subsequent
8rbid., pp. 530-31.
^Schlesinger, Crisis of Old Order, p. 129.
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years. Of the six counties that voted for Smith, only Audubon and Plym­
outh had been staunchly Republican since the Populist days. Therefore, 
the change in those counties' voting patterns represented a significant
political realignment. Perhaps the La Follette vote in 192*+ was a transi-
11tional stage in the eventual switch to the Democrats. In two consecutive 
presidential elections, Plymouth and Crawford Counties demonstrated voting 
behavior that strayed from their traditional local politics. It may be 
significant that these were the same counties that experienced martial law 
during the farm revolt of 1933*
In the 1928 election, Plymouth County's farm vote again explained the 
altered voting pattern of the county. Of the twnety-two exclusively rural 
precincts in the county, thirteen reported a majority for Smith. Only two 
of the eight town-influenced precincts cast a majority for the Democratic 
candidate.^
Iowa's gubernatorial election in 1928 was easily won by the Republican 
candidate. Only nine counties, Including Plymouth, voted for the Democratic 
candidate. Again dominated by rural precinct majorities for the Democratic 
candidate, Plymouth County cast the state's fourth greatest percentage vote
■^Whitney, Iowa Official Register, 1929-30» PP* *+22-23.
■^Robinson, Presidential Vote, 1896-1932, pp. 83-83. Another study, 
related to the 192*+ vote in Pittsburgh, suggests that the La Follette vote 
in that city was a step in the transition from a traditional. Republican voting 
posture to the Democratic party by the 1932 election. Perhaps a similar 
transition was present in Plymouth County. See Bruce M. Stave, "The 'La 
Follette Revolution’ and the Pittsburgh Vote, 1932»” Mid America *+9 (Octo­
ber, 1967): 2*+*+-51.
"^Whitney, Iowa Official Register, 1929-30* PP. *+17-18. Although 
covering a different time period, an excellent discussion of the voting 
behavior differences and political animosity between the farmer and the 
villager can be found In Stanley B. Parsons, "Who Were The Nebraska Pop­
ulists?" Nebraska History *+*+ (June, 19&3)* 85-92. One can speculate
that similar forces that pitted farmer against townsmen In the 1890s 
persisted into the Depression years of the 1930s*
for the Democratic gubernatorial aspirant.1  ^ Hovever, the county's polit­
ical turn-about was not thoroughgoing in 1928. Plymouth County voted 
heavily for a Republican congressional candidate in that year. With the 
exception of the governor's race, the county vote for all other state
lli
offices favored the Republican candidates. At the local level, there 
vere nine politically contested county offices in 1928. In those elections, 
Plymouth County elected eight Republicans and only one Democrat. In addi­
tion, the county elected a Republican state senator and state representa­
tive. ^  By 1928, Plymouth County displayed a significant change in polit­
ical behavior, indicative of discontent, and this change vas grounded in the 
farm precincts of the county. But the discontent vas not thorough enough 
to change the political complexion of the county entirely. Hovever, as the 
depression mounted, Plymouth County continued to undergo political altera­
tions .
In the 1930 local elections, Plymouth County took a decided turn 
tovard the Democratic Party. Of the nine county officials elected, five 
vere Democrats vhich represented an increase of four Democratic county 
officers over 1928. And in terms of county officials, Plymouth became the 
most Democratic county in northwest Iova.^ Plymouth County also elected 
a Democratic state representative in 1930.^ Hovever, in statewide elec­
tions Plymouth County continued to vote Republican. The county Joined
13Whitney, Iova Official Register, 1929-30, pp. UlT-l8 and l+2l*-25.
\ - - -r- t  -r —  -
lkTbid., pp. 1*17-18 and 1*35.
^ Ibid. 9 pp. 195 and 203-06.
■^^ Whitney, Iova Official Register, 1931-32, p. 189.
17lbid., p. 209.
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the rest of the state in electing Republican Governor Dan Turner and a host
of other Republican state officers. Turner, however, won only a narrow
victory in Plymouth County with one-half of the rural precincts voting for
1 8the Democratic candidate.
By 1932, the economic depression dominated the political scene. Nation­
wide, the Democrats swept into political office. In Plymouth County, the 
movement to the Democratic Party was also exceptionally strong. This polit­
ical movement occurred between the farm strike of autumn and the anti-fore- 
closure campaign of the winter of 1933. Led by the farm vote, the political, 
change in Plymouth County reflected the frustration of rebellious farmers.
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Democrats swept into office in 1933. In 
the presidential election Roosevelt garnered 59 percent of the popular 
vote.-*-9 Even traditionally reliable Republican strongholds fell to the
Democrats. I6wa, which had voted Republican in nine previous presidential
2 0elections, also gave 59 percent of its popular vote to Roosevelt.
Plymouth County made almost a complete transition to the Democratic 
Party in 1932. To local observers, the altered political climate came as
no surprise. As early as March, 1932, the county’s chief newspaper pre-
21dieted a Democratic sweep locally. In the presidential election results, 
Plymouth County gave Roosevelt a three-to-one victory margin. Only two 
counties in Iowa exceeded Plymouth’s overwhelming Roosevelt vote.22 And
l8Ibid., pp. U29-30.
^Leuchtenburg, Roosevelt and the New Dead., p. IT.
^Robinson, The Presidential Vote, 1896-1932, pp. 6l and 193.
2-^LeMars Globe-Post, March 21, 1932.
2^Lester W. Drennen, ed., Iowa Official Register, 1933-3**, (Des 
Moines: State of Iowa, 1933), pp. 2i+6-UT.
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in the cases of both Carroll and Dubuque Counties, there had been an estab­
lished history of Democratic voting.23 Plymouth County, on the other hand, 
had surrendered its traditional Republican posture and produced one of the 
greatest margins of victory for Roosevelt in the state of Iova. Every
Ohprecinct in the county voted a majority for Roosevelt. .
In other 1932 election contests as veil, Plymouth County changed to a 
nev political persuasion. Iova elected Democrat Clyde Herring governor vith 
a 53 percent majority vote.^ Plymouth County gave Herring 66 percent of 
its gubernatorial vote, and the county voted vith the majority for seven
other Democratic state office contenders. Furthermore, the county sent a
of*Democratic representative to Congress by a bvo-to-one margin of victory.^ 0 
Locally, Plymouth County selected nine county officials. Democrats 
von seven of the races as the county continued its 1930 distinction as the 
most Democratically controlled county in northvest Iova. The county*s 
voters also elected a Democratic state senator and elected as state repre­
sentative a local farmer and Democrat.2?
Overall, the county’s voting behavior may be instructive in attempting 
to comprehend the local farmers* rebellion. The voting transition vhich 
began in 192U, culminated in 1932 amidst vigorous rural insurgency. The 
Republicans had not met the farmers* demands, thus they turned to the 
Democrats for solutions. Perhaps the political behavior of Plymouth County
^Robinson, The Presidential Vote, 1896-1932, pp. 83-85.
2**Drennen, Iova Official Register, 1933-3^, p. 2kl,
25rbid., p. 2U9.
26Ibid., p. 2Ul.
2?Ibid., pp. 72-73 and 127.
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farmers vas the logical result of an agrarian thinking that, by the 1920s, 
demanded governmental intervention in the farm problem. At the polling 
place, farmers agitated for governmental action. Shortly after the 1932 
election Milo Reno stated that "We are asking the government to regulate 
the prices in this basic American industry. . . .  We intend to keep on
o ( i
agitating until ve get justice." In this spirit, rural Plymouth County 
voters agitated for relief from their plight in elections from 192  ^to 
1932.29
In addition to voting behavior alterations, the presence of the Com­
munist Party in the Plymouth County area during the farm rebellion deserves 
attention. Speculation about Communist involvement in the Iova farm rebel­
lion emerged in the early stages of the uprising. During the milk strike 
around Council Bluffs, Pottavattomie County Sheriff Pat Lainson suspected 
Communists among the picketers.-^ In the LeMars region, a local newspaper 
leveled charges of Communist infiltration at area farm meetings.31 When
2&Bliven, "Milo Reno and His Farmers," p. 63.
^ P l y m o u t h  CountyTs political divergence during the farm revolt years 
continued until 1936. In the 1936 election, the county again strongly 
supported Roosevelt. Of additional interest in the 1936 election,Plymouth 
County voters gave William Lemke of the Union Party 11.3 percent of their 
vote. Only one other county in Iova exceeded Plymouth’s support for Lemke. 
Statewide,2.6 percent of the vote went to Lemke and,nationally, only 1.9 
percent voted for Lemke. Again, in 1936, Plymouth County’s voting behavior 
took on exceptional characteristics. Drennen, Iowa Official Register, 1937- 
38, pp. 312-13; William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New 
Deal. 1932-19**0. (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1963), p. 195;
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Politics of Upheaval. (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, i9 6 0), p. 6U2; and Edvard C. Blackorby, Prairie Rebel:
The Public Life of William Lemke, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1963), pp. 227-29.
^^Korgan, "Farmers Picket The Depression," p. 77.
^ LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, September 16, 1932.
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the Plymouth County revolt turned to violence in the spring of 1933, claims 
of Communist influence intensified. During investigation into the assault • 
on Judge Bradley, officialdom seemed preoccupied with the Communist threat. 
In a letter to Governor Herring, Iowa Assistant Attorney General L. W.
Powers reported on the situation in LeMars, claiming that "these men openly 
assert that their purpose is to overthrow the government, and unfortunately 
they have received a lot of aid and encouragement out of Sioux City."32 
Confirmation of the Communist presence came shortly thereafter when Attorney0
General E. L. O'Connor announced the discovery of a Communist headquarters 
in Sioux City.^3 Later, 01 Connor blamed the episodes at both Primghar and 
LeMars on Communist p r o m o t e r s . 3^ But despite the claims of a Communist
35role in the farm rebellion, no proof of Communist instigation surfaced. ' 
Communist presence in and around Plymouth County was undeniable. An 
appreciation for the Communist existence can be gained through an examina­
tion of the Communist Party's official position on the agrarian rebellion. 
John Shover investigated Communist Party involvement in the depression era 
rural insurgency, and found that the Communist Party's program for agricul­
ture was ennunciated at its 1930 convention. Basically, the Communists 
acknowledged their previous lack of attention to the agrarian problem and
32l . W. Powers to Governor Clyde Herring, May 3, 1933, Governor Clyde 
Herring Papers, Special Collections Department, University of Iowa Librar­
ies, Iova City, Iowa.
33Dileva, "Farm Revolts In Iowa," p. 109.
3^0'Brien County Bell, May 10, 1933.
35Dileva, "Farm Revolts In Iowa," p. 139*
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36resolved to actively* pursue a revolutionary* program on the farm front.
In viev of agriculture's economic dilemma, Communist leader Earl Browder
spoke for the party* when he reported to the convention that "conditions
3Tamong the farmers are ripe for us." In initiating their agrarian policy, 
the Communists developed a plan known as the "draft program." Their plan 
foresaw the coming farm revolt as one of property holders versus an eco­
nomic system which had driven them to d e s p a i r . 3®
The major personalities involved in the Communist's agrarian efforts 
were a cadre of well-established Party regulars. Harold Ware, experienced 
in the Party's agricultural interests, oversaw the rural program. Lem 
Harris was the chief field man on the rural front.39 Finally, Ella Reeve 
Bloor, Ware's mother, managed local rural organizing drives with her hus­
band Andrew Omholt.^ But before this group could fully swing into action, 
the rural revolt began in earnest with the farm strike of August and Sep­
tember,- 1932. Recognizing Sioux City as the center of the rebellion, the
Communists moved to action in the Sioux City area in an attempt to catch
bla revolt that was running ahead of them.
3^Shover, "Communist Party and the Midwest Farm Crisis," p. 250.
3?Earl Browder, "Report of Political Committee To Plenum," The Com­
munist 10 (January, 1931): 18.
3®Shover, "Communist Party and the Midwest Farm Crisis," p. 250.
39Ibid. , pp. 250-51.
^Ella Reeve Bloor, We Are Many, (New York: International Publishers,
19^0), pp. 231-32; and Lem Harris, "Communists In Farm Struggles,” Political 
Affairs 58 (August-September, 1979): 67.
^Shover, "Communist Party and the Midvest Farm Crisis," p. 252.
12k
The Communist Party’s newspaper, the Daily Worker, quickly announced 
support for the strike movement, but suggested that farmers broaden their
struggle and aim it at banks and the taxation system as veil as the market
Upplace. c Later, in an editorial, the Daily Worker urged farmers to unite 
vith the vorking class to enlarge their movement. Perhaps most important, 
"the Communist paper denounced farm organizations, including the Farmers' 
Union, because "everyone of these organizations is carrying out the policy 
of Wall Street." Rather than blindly follow the existing farm organiza­
tions , the Daily Worker encouraged farmers to establish local committees 
of action to carry the fight. Communist condemnation of farm groups even 
carried to the Farmers' Holiday Association itself, when the Daily Worker 
urged striking farmers to ignore Milo Reno's call for the end of the strike 
prior to the Sioux City Governors' Conference
The first indication of actual Communist presence in the farm strike 
in Plymouth County came in mid-August, 1932. Sam Mosher, Plymouth County 
Farmers' Holiday Association member and leader of the milk strike, informed 
the local press that "Communists tried to horn in on the milk strike in the 
last U8 hours."^5 The Communists reportedly offered assistance in the dis­
tribution of dairy products to the needy during the strike and volunteered 
to lead more drastic actions including dumping milk, overturning trucks,
^ Daily Worker, August 18, 1932.
1|3Ibid. , August 19, 1932. 
k^Ibid., September 2, 1932.
^LeMars Globe-Post, August 15, 1932.
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and halting railroad milk shipments.^ In an interview with 0. N. Kelly, 
a Plymouth County Holiday member, Lowell Dyson found that local farmers 
conversed vith Harold Ware and other Party members during the farm strike, 
hut were not swayed by them.^
When the farm strike waned in September, the Communists capitalized 
on the Sioux City Governor's Conference, in an attempt to strengthen their 
operation. Approximately 15,000 farmers attended a parade and rally on 
September 9. The assembly, organized for the convening governors by the
J, Q
Farmers* Holiday Association, was to symbolize the farmers' plight. 
Capitalizing on the farmers' protest, the Communists, under the direction 
of Ware and Mother Bloor, organized a meeting of approximately fifty farm­
ers. The only significant development was a call for a farmers' march on
llO
Washington, D. C., in December. ^
The march on Washington held importance for the farm revolt around 
Sioux City. At the Washington conference, the Communists established the 
Farmers' National Committee for Action as the organization to coordinate 
local committees for action.^ The Farmers' National Committee established 
a local office in Sioux City and conducted rural organizing efforts in the 
Sioux City territory from this office.^
**6Ibid.
^Dyson, "The Farm Holiday Movement," p. 8U.
^^Sioux City Journal, September 10, 1932.
^^Shover, "Communist Party and the Midwest Farm Crisis," p. 252; and 
Bloor, We Are Many, pp. 23^-35.
^Shover, "Communist Party in the Midwest Farm Crisis," p. 257.
5lBloor, We Are Many, p. 238.
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Mother Bloor spent much of the autumn of 1932 involved in the Com­
munist* s presidential election campaign in nearby North and South D a k o t a *  52 
After she attended the Washington conference, she embarked on a speaking 
tour of the Sioux ,City area. Her return to western Iowa coincided with, 
but was unrelated to, the outbreak of anti-foreclosure sales. J One of 
Mother Bloor*s addresses reportedly attracted 1,000 farmers in LeMars on 
January 7, 1933. Earlier in the day, many of the same farmers had halted 
a local foreclosure sale. At the LeMars gathering, Bloor was able to rally 
numerous local farmers in support of a march on the state capital. How­
ever, the local Holiday Association countered by condemning the march and 
suggesting that farmers could better serve their purposes locally by halt­
ing foreclosure sales.5^ Apparently, the Communists were still recognized 
and treated as outsiders during the winter of 1933 in Plymouth County. 55
Following the attack on Judge Bradley in April, 1933, there was a 
brief contact between Plymouth County farmers and the Communists. The 
night after the National Guard arrived in the county, several local farm­
ers approached Mother Bloor at her Sioux City headquarters seeking man­
power and arms with which to resist the National Guard. Bloor convinced 
the farmers that local rallies and protests to the governor against the 
use of the National Guard were better solutions to their problems.5^ In
52Ibid., pp. 231-32.
53shover, "Communist Party and the Midwest Farm Crisis," p. 258.
5^LeMars Globe-Post, January 9, 1933.
55shover, "Communist Party and the Midwest Farm Crisis," p. 258.
5^Bloor, We Are Many, pp. 237-38.
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1962, Dyson interviewed Otto Anstrom who was present at Bloor*s headquar­
ters that night and he independently confirmed Bloorfs account of events 
Three days after the encounter between Plymouth County farmers and Mother 
Bloor, -the National Guard raided the small Communist headquarters in Sioux
City and arrested four workers. Mother Bloor was not among those appre-
58hended. Before the raid, however, the Communists had sent a letter of 
protest to Governor Herring on behalf of Plymouth County farmers. The 
letter condemned Herring for using "the National Guard as a collection 
agency for the Wall Street bankers and their powerful insurance companies."59
During the formal investigation into the Plymouth County disturbance, 
numerous charges of Communist involvement arose. The preceding information 
appears to be the extent of Communist presence in and around Plymouth County. 
The Communist Party was present and tried to organize local farmers, however, 
its position in the local rebellion was peripheral and the overall impact 
was marginal. Specifically, Communist ineffectiveness in Plymouth County 
can be traced to two causes. First, the Party never led, but rather fol­
lowed farmer activism in the local rebellion. Second, the Communists1 did 
not understand the local, limited nature of the Plymouth County unrest.
In the major events of the local insurgency, the farmers provoked
-actions on which the Communists attempted to capitalize. The August, 1932,
Holiday and milk strike were in progress when Communists Joined the
^Dyson, "The Farm Holiday Movement," p. l8k.
5^Sioux City Journal, May 2, 1933.
^Farmers* National Committee for Action, Sioux City, to Governor Herring, 
Herring Papers.
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struggle.^0 Plymouth County farmers had also effectively conducted their 
first anti-foreclosure tactics prior to Communist aid and guidance in that 
area.^1 Moreover, after the assault on Judge Bradley, local farmers ap­
pealed to Mother Bloor for assistance rather than the Communists reaching
62out to assist the desperate farmers. While Bloor and Ware vere present 
during the Governors* Conference in Sioux City, they determined that farm­
ers in that territory vere organized and they saw "more chance of making 
gains" vith a nevly forming group of Nebraska farmers Apparently the 
Communists turned their attention to areas vhere they could lead or have 
more influence rather than areas vhere farmers appeared already organized.
Second, the Plymouth County revolt vas aimed at short-range goals 
and parochial concerns. The Communists, as early as 1930, had announced 
that "the immediate task of the Communist Party is to bring class strug­
gle into agriculture."^ But there vas not a great deal, of Plymouth 
County farmer interest in affairs beyond the immediate area. They desired 
improved prices for agricultural produce and the maintenance of their 
farms. In this spirit, the Holiday, the milk strike, and the anti-fore­
closure crusade vere conducted for local gains. When farmers vere urged 
by Mother Bloor to organize for a march on the state capitol, the Plymouth
^LeMars Globe-Post, August 15, 1932.
^Ibid., January 9> 1933.
^2Bloor, We Are Many, pp. 237-38.
63Lement Harris, Harold M. Ware (1890-1935): Agricultural Pioneer,
USA and USSR, (Nev Yoriki American Institute for Marxist Studies, 1978), 
p. 6l; and Shover, "Communist Party and the Midvest Farm Crisis,” pp. 253- 
55.
^The Communist, 9 (April, 1930): 372.
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County Holiday president quickly dashed the effort by pressing the farm­
ers to "stay right here and vatch Plymouth C o u n t y ."^5 The overall Commun­
ist program vas out of step with Plymouth County farmers1 goals. The 
Party had a long range plan vith national goals that vere intended to 
eventually revolutionize American agriculture.^ But little in the broad 
Communist program appealed to the immediate and particular demands of Plym­
outh County farmers.
In a general, sense, the Communists failed to gain significant influ­
ence in the Plymouth County farm rebellion because they did not understand 
the midvestern agrarian mind. Commenting on farmer receptivity to com­
munism in 1933, the editors of The Nation suggested that "most of them 
have never heard of Karl Marx, or if they have, think he is a brother of 
Grocho."^ The editors’ sarcasm belied the intelligence of Iova farmers. 
Farmers were sensitive to charges of Communist association and distrustful
ZTQ
of outside leadership. In February, 1933, Reno indicated a concern about 
Communist involvement, fearing "that Russian Communists are endeavoring to 
gain a foothold in the Holiday Association and either control or destroy 
it."^9 Later Reno warned farmers of their two enemies; the capitalistic 
group and the "more vicious" Communists.*^® The LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel 
provided an indication of anti-Communist sentiment on the local level by
^ LeMars Globe-Post, January 9, 1933.
cc
Shover, "Communist Party and the Midvest Farm Crisis," p. 250.
6?The Nation, May 17, 1933, p. 5^.
6®Shover, "Communist Party and the Midwest Farm Crisis," p. 26l.
^Reno to Jake Taylor, February 20, 1933, Reno Papers.
7QFarm Holiday News, July, 1933.
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portraying Communism as a "snake in the grass'* in a cartoon prior to the 
farm strike of 1932.^* Striking farmers often quickly rejected Communist 
aid when the farm strike began, and were careful to prevent outside or 
Communist influence at meetings where picketing votes were taken.^ In 
the LeMars area, the Communists saw a fertile field for their revolution­
ary program, but because they mis gauged rural sentiment they had a very 
small impact on the local rebellion.^
Perhaps Ware struck a sensitive cord in his own analysis of the Com­
munist position in the farm rebellion. The Farmers* Holiday Association 
threatened another farm strike in May, 1933. Pending the outcome of the 
agricultural legislation then being debated in Congress, and because of 
the recent violence around LeMars, Milo Reno led an effort to stall the 
planned May 13 strike.^ Ware prepared to blast Reno editorially in the 
Farmers * National Weekly.^  But when Ware travelled to Iowa, visited with 
farmers, and heard Reno's speeches, he changed his approach. He notified 
the editor of the Farmers' National Weekly,
^ LeMars Semi-Weekly Sentinel, July 8, 1932.
^2Sioux City Journal, August 15* 1932, p. 8; and Korgan, "Farmers 
Picket The Depression," p. 79.
"^Korgan, "Farmers Picket The Depression," pp. 189-90.
f^Shover, Combelt Rebellion, pp. 13^-35.
^Lement Harris, Harold M. .Ware (1890-1935): Agricultural Pioneer,
pp. 62-6U. Ware had long believed that the key to organizing an effective 
Communist movement in the countryside was in formulating the right type 
of farm publication. At the Communist-sponsored Farmers' National Relief 
Conference held in Washington in December, 1932, organizers launched the 
Farmers' National Weekly as the hoped-for farm publication. The paper 
began publication on January 30, 1933* with Ware giving close attention 
to editorials and circulation.
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Don't print the next issue until you get my full report I We 
have got to ahout faceJ I was all wet on planning to continue 
to attack. Reno personifies their movement to the great major­
ity of Iowa farmers. To attack him personally is to attack 
them— until he slips again— as he will when his latest truce 
ends.76
Ware's comment is instructive. Although Holiday Association leadership 
did not have firm control of the farm rebellion it had initiated, Reno 
and other leaders apparently did express fundamental ideals that 
appealed to many agrarian rebels.
In terms of political behavior, one point is clear about Plymouth 
County. The county's farmers were essentially a conservative body. Even 
though some rural elements diverged politically to vote for La Follette 
in 1924, and Lemke in 193&, the dominant tendency was adherence to the 
two major political parties. That the Communists failed to achieve 
significant inroads in the county is a further indication of political 
conservatism. In conclusion, Plymouth County farmers sought improved 
agricultural prices and security on their farms, not political revolution.
76Ibid., p. 64.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
In its most successful phase, the Farmers* Holiday Association gained 
important attention for its actions in Plymouth County, Iova, from August, 
1932, to April, 1933. After the violence in the spring of 1933, the Holi­
day movement lost support and slowly faded in Plymouth County. Perhaps 
rank and file farmers in the Holiday group were driven off "by the violence. 
Certainly, by the autumn of 1933, popular sentiment in the county turned 
against the Holiday* s renewed effort at striking,when "Law and Order 
Leagues” emerged under the auspices of the county sheriff. These leagues, 
led by H. W. Brosamle and containing 500 members, opened roads as small 
numbers of Holiday picketers tried once again to prevent the flow of farm 
produce to market.1 Even I. W. Reck, one of the leaders of the previous 
year*s milk strike, Joined the law and order group and denounced the new
Holiday effort, exhorting local farmers instead to ’’get their feet on the 
o
ground.” John Shover has concluded that the abortive strike attempt in
-a
the autumn of 1933 bordered on lunacy and extremism. Exemplifying this 
extremism, Roy Martin of Kingsley vas arrested and convicted for carrying
^LeMars Globe-Post, November 9, 1933.
^Ibid., November 16, 1933.
•^ Shover, Combelt Rebellion, pp. 1U9-6T.
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a gun as he and other Holiday members crashed a meeting in which the Sioux 
City Milk Producers were voting non-support for the strike.1*
The changing agriculture picture probably also hindered the Holiday’s 
1933 strike effort. As local com prices rose from twenty-two cents per
bushel in late April to thirty-nine cents by the end of July, some farmers
5undoubtedly saw a brighter day ahead for agriculture. Reflecting the 
shift in northwest Iowa farmers’ attitudes, the secretary of the local Sioux 
City Holiday Association resigned his post in order to take a position with 
the recently formed Agricultural Adjustment Administration.^ The impact of 
the New Beal agricultural program was noticeable in Plymouth County, as the 
LeMars Globe-Post admonished farmers to sign up for the corn-hog program, 
asserting that ’'when you have a chance to get Uncle Sam’s check for any­
where from $300 to $1,000, and even more, there’s something wrong with you 
if you don’t take it."? Later the local Holiday Association, itself, met 
to hear president C. J. Schultz discuss how the cora-hog program would help
Q
farmers. The combination of anti-Holiday sentiment, and an improved agri­
cultural outlook, eased the Farmers’ Holiday Association from center-stage. 
But in its heyday, the Holiday in Plymouth County illustrated features of 
an important rural rebellion that should not escape historical attention.
The assembly and management of crowds of farmers for direct action 
purposes was no small accomplishment. With crowds reaching perhaps as many
^LeMars Globe-Post, November 23, 1933.
5Ibid., July 27, 1933.
I^tyson, "The Farm Holiday Movement," p. 252.
7LeMars Globe-Post, November 16, 1933.
®Ibid., December h, 1933.
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as 1500 in number, and composed almost totally of farmers, the 1930s* 
activism in Plymouth County became a significant protest movement.9 George 
Rude has studied crowds in history and found a popular tradition in direct 
action rural protest. In investigations of rural crowds in England and 
France in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Rude has concluded that 
the protests stemmed directly from conditions related to livelihood and 
economics. Citing the specific case of crowds during the French Revolu­
tion, Rude points out that they were "composed of ordinary men and women 
with varying social needs, who responded to a variety of impulses."^1 
Bearing in mind the general, farm strike, the milk strike, penny-sales, and 
the anti-foreclosure movement, all conducted by local, farmers, the farm 
revolt in Plymouth County would seem to fit a broad historical pattern of 
crowd behavior and rural protest. Conclusions on this point must, of 
necessity, be tentative. But, the general characteristics and importance 
of the crowd phenomenon suggests there might be implications for the Plym­
outh County Farmers* Holiday movement beyond the confines of the county and 
its activism of the 1930s.
Individually, farmers in Plymouth County could not contend with the 
impersonal economic conditions of the 1930s. Rapidly declining commodity 
prices, bank closings, and an avalanche of farm foreclosures, left many 
farmers destitute. In these circumstances, there was a strong movement 
toward organization by local farmers. This organizational tendency fit
9Ibid., August 15, 1932.
-^Rude, The Crowd In Hi story« pp. 35-^.
^Rude, The Crowd In The French Revolution, pp. 232-33.
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an agrarian tradition since the beginning of this society*s industrial 
age.-*-2 Plymouth County farmers showed an exceptional turn toward organi­
zation in the 1930s. In 1931, the county ranked second in Iowa in in­
creased membership in the Farmers1 Union, and fifth in total membership 
in what then was Iowa*s largest member farm organization.^ At the peak 
of i;he farmer activism in January, 1933, Plymouth County ranked fourth 
in total Iowa Farmers* Union membership.^ With the Farmers* Union serv­
ing as the unofficial parent organization of the Farmers* Holiday Associa­
tion, local farmers looked to cooperative action for resolution of their 
problems.^ In the tradition of the Grange, the Alliance, and the Popu­
list movements, the Holiday Association applied a collective rural approach 
to the problems of the depression. Although extreme in some of its views, 
the Holiday movement, epitomized by the activities in Plymouth County, 
illustrated a continuation of the important organizational theme in the 
American agrarian tradition.
In terms of leadership, another feature of the Plymouth County Holi­
day movement reflected the heritage of agrarian organizations. During 
the rural unrest of the late nineteenth century, agricultural leadership 
came primarily from the farm. Although there was a tendency toward a 
professional guidance in the early twentieth century, much agricultural 
leadership still consisted of real farmers. Writing about the depression
•^Hayes, The Response To Industrialism, pp. 58-63.
^ipva Union Farmer, January 13, 1932.
^Ibid., January 25, 1933.
^McConnell, The Decline of Agrarian Democracy, p. 68.
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farm revolt, Paul Johnstone suggests that "probably no movement vas ever 
more genuinely indigenous than the farm-holiday movement of the early 
1 9 3 0 s . M i l o  Reno himself certainly upheld the role of a genuine rural- 
based leader.^ In Plymouth County, the Holiday leadership, both formal 
and informal, consisted of real farmers threatened by the depression. Ex­
amination of the local Holiday movement makes for an engaging study of an 
important rebellion. Perhaps more important, hovever, is the appreciation 
to be gained in examining ordinary people, led by real farmers, as they 
agitated for immediate relief from their desperate condition.
One further trait of the Holiday uprising, reminiscent of earlier 
agrarian crusades, vas the division of the movement into two clear fac­
tions ; one seeking short-range solutions and the other demanding long-
18range agricultural reform. Milo Reno*s "cost-of-production” ideal of 
the 1930s, not unlike the "free coinage of silver” in the Populist move­
ment, served as a rallying cry for economically depressed farmers. Hovever, 
when a measure of economic improvement and security emerged in 1933 in the 
form of mortgage moratorium lavs and some increase in prices, support for 
Reno’s longer range agricultural reform waned. In a similar fashion, as
agricultural prices moved upward in 1896, the Populists lost support for
19their broader agrarian reform ideas. The defection from the Holiday in 
the face of an improved agricultural outlook has already been pointed out.
Johnstone, ”01d Ideals Versus New Ideas,” p. 157*
ITShover, Cornbelt Rebellion, p. 25-
l8Ibid., p. 206.
^Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, pp. 109-11.
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A general significance may be found in the tendency of agrarian organiza­
tions to thrive in crisis situations vhen rank and file farmers are moved 
by immediate and particular problems. However, genuine enthusiasm for 
long-range agricultural reform fades quickly in the presence of even modest 
economic gains. The case of the Plymouth County Holiday in the 1930s clear­
ly lends credence to this inclination in American agrarian movements.
Motivated by the desire for economic stability, it is probable that 
the agrarian rebellion in Plymouth County in the 1930s was basically a main­
stream agricultural movement. Some of the rhetoric and actions of the rural 
revolt took on extreme characteristics, but the depth of feeling in such 
expressions is questionable. For example, C. J. Schultz, excited by success 
when the Holiday stopped a foreclosure sale and temporarily bested a cred­
itor, wrote to Milo Reno boasting, "who said we can’t drive the fear of
20God into those robbers and cutthroats." However, although local farmers 
resorted to bold direct action, and occasional violence, they were gener­
ally law-abiding mainstream types. Following the prevention of a fore­
closure sale in January, 1933, LeMars Globe-Post editor R. F. Starzl was 
invited to write a guest editorial for the New York Times. In his editor­
ial, Starzl noted that the assembled crowd was dominated by middle-aged, 
conservative farmers. The local newspaper suggested that the extent of 
radical farmer behavior could be judged by other simultaneous actions. 
Therefore, Starzl pointed out that at the same time the farmers prevented
the execution of a legal process, "they obeyed all the no parking signs
21around the courthouse."
v
Of)
WC. J. Schultz to Milo Reno, January 7, 1933s Reno Papers.
^ New York Times, January 8, 1933, p. E6.
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In making the preceding conclusions about the Plymouth County farm 
revolt of 1932-33* one must be cautious. After all, the events in this 
single Iowa county were only a small part of a larger agricultural rebellion 
directed against general economic hard times. But the extent of activity 
and basic trends of the rural unrest in the county are worthy of tentative 
judgments.
The Holiday activities in Plymouth County served to help focus 
national attention on the plight of American agriculture. Even though the 
broad goals of the Farmers’ Holiday Association were not achieved, the 
farm srtike and the anti-foreclosure crusade gave an urgency to the
agricultural program of the Roosevelt administration in the spring of
22
1933.
The Plymouth County Farmers* Holiday movement, taken as a microcosm 
of agrarian sentiment in the 1930s, is helpful in understanding the 
desperation of those years for some elements of American society. The 
drive by common farmers to improve prices and save their farms from fore­
closure was consistent with earlier agrarian experiences of protest and 
activism. In this spirit, northwest Iowa farmers were not widely separated 
from the likes of Daniel Shays, Pennsylvania whiskey tax rebels, or the 
late nineteenth century agrarian movements. The search by Plymouth 
County farmers for remedies to immediate and pressing problems in the 
1930s constitutes an important local uprising in the general stream of 
farmer activism and the American agrarian heritage.
Leuchtenburg, Franklin.P. Roosevelt and the New Deal, pp. 48^51*
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